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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the Intel IA-64 architecture's capability to support a secure 
virtual machine monitor. The major mission of a virtual machine monitor is to provide an 
execution environment identical to the real machine environment for virtual machines. A 
VMM duplicates the real resources of a processor for virtual machines while making a 
virtual machine think that it is running on a real machine. As a result, a virtual machine 
monitor allows multiple virtual machines to run concurrently on the same machine. 
A secure VMM on the Intel IA-64 architecture would offer several benefits. A 
secure VMM would ensure that security policy is enforced by constraining information 
flow between the supported virtual machines. This would provide PC users with a more 
secure environment in which to run COTS operating systems. 
The Intel IA-64 architecture was analyzed to determine if it is virtualizable. 
Three types of virtual machine monitors and their hardware requirements have been 
defined. The IA-64 architecture was mapped to these hardware requirements. Analysis 
showed that the IA-64 architecture meets three main hardware requirements. However, 
IA-64 instruction set contains 18 sensitive unprivileged instructions. These instructions 
prevent the IA-64 architecture from being used for a Type I VMM. Several virtualization 
techniques used in some architectures are discussed to determine if these techniques 
could be applicable to virtualization of the IA-64 architecture. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
A significant revolution in computer technology has taken place over the past 30 
years. The advent of the modern operating systems shielded programmers and typical 
users from the complexity of the hardware. When users or their programs require 
services to be performed, they call the operating system which performs the actual 
services and resource allocation. However, system programmers desire or need direct 
access to the real resources of the system. Their programs cannot run under the control 
of the normal operating system. Therefore, to do their jobs, system programmers have to 
both work in the computing facility and make the system inaccessible to other users. 
Virtual machine monitors were invented to resolve these difficulties. 
Basically, a virtual machine (VM) is an identical and efficient copy of the real 
machine. Each virtual machine can be considered a separate operating system platform. 
A virtual machine monitor (VMM) mediates between the virtual machines and the real 
machine, and provides an execution environment identical to the real machine 
environment for the virtual machines. Making a virtual machine think that it is running 
on a real machine has many benefits. First, a user can run multiple operating systems on 
the same computer concurrently. Second, a user can test the new versions of an operating 
system without having to completely reboot the entire system from the beginning. Third, 
virtual machines can be used to upgrade an operating system without corrupting the 
original operating system. Fourth, a user can run applications on different environments 
without having to use another real machine. Finally, virtual machine monitors provide an 
environment for interactive debugging of an operating system. 
xvii 
The goal of this thesis is to determine whether any type of VMM can be built on 
the IA-64 architecture. If a VMM can be built on the IA-64 architecture, its security will 
be examined. 
Three types of virtual machine monitors are discussed. A Type I VMM runs on a 
real machine and can be treated as an operating system that is responsible for providing 
an execution environment and resource allocation for VMs. A Type II VMM runs as an 
application under a host operating system and provides only virtualization services. The 
host operating system handles the resource allocation and provides the extended 
environment for the VMM. A Hybrid Virtual Machine (HVM) is identical to a VMM. 
The major differences between an HVM and a VMM are that, in a HVM, all privileged 
instructions are interpreted by software while in a VMM, privileged instructions can 
execute directly on the real processor. 
In order to support a VMM, a processor must be able to be virtualized. If all 
sensitive instructions, which cause interpretation problems and interfere with underlying 
VMM when they are executed directly by a VM, are also privileged, then the processor is 
said to be virtualizable. This means all sensitive, privileged instructions will trap to the 
VMM. 
The hardware and software requirements for virtualization are given for each type 
of VMM. Then, the Intel IA-64 architecture is analyzed to determine if it is virtualizable. 
The Intel IA-64 architecture was designed to overcome the performance limitations of 
today's architectures. With some innovative features such as speculation, predication and 
register rotation, the IA-64 architecture can address the requirements of high-end 
xviii 
workstation and server applications. The IA-64 architecture was mapped to hardware 
requirements. Analysis showed that, the IA-64 architecture meets three main hardware 
requirements to support a Type I VMM. That is; 
(1) There is no difference between the methods of executing instructions in 
supervisor and user modes in the IA-64 architecture. 
(2) The IA-64 has mechanisms, such as a protection system and address 
translation system that protects the real and virtual machines from the active VM. 
(3) The IA-64 architecture uses interrupts, faults and traps that cause the flow 
of control to be passed to an interrupt handling routine when an unprivileged task 
executes a privileged instruction. 
However, the IA-64 instruction set contains sensitive, unprivileged instructions. 
Since the unprivileged instructions do not generate an interrupt, fault or trap, the VMM 
will have no opportunity to simulate the behavior of the instruction. 
Each of the IA-64 architecture's instructions documented as of July 2000 was 
examined. The examination found 18 instructions that make the IA-64 architecture non- 
virtualizable. The table below lists the 18 instructions and the reason why they do not 
meet VMM requirements. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
REASON FOR VMM REQUIREMENTS VIOLATION 
3al 3a2 3bl 3b2 3cl 3c2 3c3 3d 
br.call, br.ret, 
cmpxchg, probe, fetchadd, 
xchg, Id, ldf, ldfp, st, stf 
X 
fc, lfetch X X 





The reasons for violation of the VMM requirements are as follows: 
3al : References or changes the mode of the processor. 
3a2 : References or changes the state of the processor. 
3b 1 : References or changes sensitive registers. 
3b2 : References or changes sensitive memory locations. 
3c 1 : References or changes privilege level. 
3c2 : References the memory system. 
3c3 : Interferes with address translations. 
3d : I/O instructions. 
Several architectures including the VAX security kernel, Intel 80x86, DISCO and 
Alpha, and virtualization techniques used for virtualization of these architectures are 
discussed to determine if these techniques would also be applicable to virtualizing the IA- 
64 architecture. 
After current VMM architectures and virtualization techniques were analyzed, it 
became clear that some slight modifications to the Intel IA-64 architecture could make 
virtualization easier. First, all 18 sensitive, unprivileged instructions could be 
redesignated as privileged instructions. A second modification could be to implement a 
trap on op-code instruction. 
A secure VMM on the IA-64 architecture would offer several benefits. First, it 
could eliminate the need for dedicated systems for each security level. Second, PC users 
xx 
would be able to work in a high assurance system with commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
operating systems. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
A modern computer system is a complex system.   It consists of one or more 
processors, main memory, terminals, network interfaces and input/output devices. 
Writing programs that manage and use these components is extremely difficult. Many 
years ago, it became clear that a solution had to be found to shield programmers and 
typical users from the complexity of the hardware. The way that has evolved is to put a 
layer of software on top of the real hardware to manage all components of the system and 
provide users with an interface that is easier to understand. This solution, known as an 
operating system, eliminated the need for direct access to the real system resources by a 
user's program. 
However, system programmers need direct access to the real resources of the 
system. Unlike a user's programs, their programs have to be run on a real machine and 
cannot run under the control of the normal operating system. Therefore, to do their jobs, 
system programmers have to both work in the computing facility and make the system 
inaccessible to other users. Virtual machine monitors (VMMs) were invented to resolve 
these difficulties. 
A virtual machine monitor is software that mediates between the virtual machine 
and the real machine. A virtual machine monitor allows multiple virtual machines to run 
concurrently on a single computer by managing the real resources and allocating these 
real resources to the virtual machines as needed. Basically, a virtual machine (VM) is an 
efficient and identical copy of the real machine. Each virtual machine can be considered a 
1 
separate operating system platform. A secure VMM would ensure that security policy is 
enforced by constraining information flow between the supported virtual machines 
(VMs). Two operating systems could be at different security levels and sharing between 
the virtual machines would be possible only as allowed by security policy. 
Intel designed a processor called Itanium™ (formerly code-named Merced), 
based on the IA-64 architecture to overcome the performance limitations of today's 
architectures. With some innovative features such as speculation, predication, branch 
architecture and register rotation, the IA-64 architecture could address the requirements 
of high-end workstation and server applications. If a secure VMM could be built for the 
IA-64 architecture, it would be very powerful. It would be useful to understand the 
feasibility of building a secure VMM on the Intel IA-64. The ability of the processor to 
support a secure VMM could determine how future secure network architectures might 
be designed. 
A secure VMM on the Intel IA-64 architecture would offer several benefits. First, 
it could eliminate the need for separate systems for each classification level. Second, 
computer users would be able to work in a highly secure environment and still run 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software applications. Intel has not stated if a VMM 
can be built on the Intel IA-64 architecture. 
B.        THESIS GOAL 
The goal of this thesis is to determine whether any type of VMM can be built on 
the IA-64 architecture. If a VMM can be built on the IA-64 architecture, its security will 
be examined. 
This work requires a detailed understanding of the processor's organization and 
architecture as well as its instruction set and also involves an understanding of virtual 
machine monitors. 
C.       RELATED WORK 
There are several works related to this thesis. Most of the information about the 
virtual machine monitor concept is given by Goldberg [Ref. 7]. In his thesis, Goldberg 
gives the definition of the virtual computer systems. He introduces three types of virtual 
machine monitors and develops hardware and software requirements for virtualization in 
order to implement a virtual machine monitor on a processor's hardware. 
Also, Popek introduces formal requirements for virtualizable third generation 
architectures [Ref. 8]. He describes the essential characteristics and modules of the virtual 
machine monitors. 
Several previous efforts constructed VMMs. The VAX security kernel is one of 
them. The VAX security kernel was a research effort that resulted in a VMM for the 
VAX architecture [Ref. 12]. The VAX security kernel creates virtual VAX processors 
and provides isolation and controlled sharing of sensitive information. The VAX security 
kernel applies mandatory and discretionary access controls to virtual machines. 
Other work analyzes the Intel architecture. Lawton proposes several virtualization 
techniques that allow multiple operating systems to run concurrently on an IA32 PC [Ref. 
21].     He developed a product called FreeMWare (renamed plex86) that provides 
something similar to a VMM for the Intel architecture.  On the other hand, in his thesis, 
Robin analyzes the Intel Pentium's capability to support a secure virtual machine monitor 
[Ref. 11]. He states that the Intel architecture is not virtualizable. Robin concludes that 
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even though the FreeMWare provides something similar to a VMM for the Intel 
architecture, none of the VMMs for the Intel architecture should be considered a secure 
VMM. 
Today, there is no related work that discusses Intel IA-64 architecture support for 
a secure VMM. This thesis builds upon previous and related work that discusses the 
requirements for virtualization, and virtualization techniques to contribute to our 
understanding of the Intel IA-64 architecture's capability to support a secure VMM. 
D.       THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter II contains a 
brief summary of the Intel IA-64 architecture. The new features, application and system 
state, addressing and protection mechanisms of the IA-64 architecture are addressed in 
this chapter. In Chapter m, VM and VMM concepts are introduced. Three different 
types of VMMs and their hardware virtualization requirements are given. Chapter IV 
examines all of the instructions of the IA-64 instruction set in order to determine if the 
IA-64 architecture is virtualizable. The instructions that violate the hardware 
virtualization requirements are discussed in more detail. Chapter V analyzes whether or 
not the IA-64 architecture can be made virtualizable. Several architectures such as the 
VAX security kernel, the Intel x86, the Disco and the Alpha are discussed in order to 
present several virtualization techniques. Finally, chapter VI provides a conclusion for 
this thesis work and also addresses future work. 
II.     INTEL IA-64 ARCHITECTURE 
As  technology rapidly expands,  so does the need for higher performance 
computing. Today, computer architecture must develop at a pace that will enable 
hardware to meet the growing demands of increasingly sophisticated applications and 
operating systems. Applications such as Internet communication, e-commerce and data 
warehousing make heavy demands on high performance workstations and servers. While 
the performance of today's processors continues to improve, architectures based on out- 
of-order execution models, that is, processors that use multiple execution units to execute 
instructions in non-sequential order (i.e., instruction 2 can execute before instruction 1 
has completed), require complex hardware mechanisms to make sure that results of 
execution are reassembled into the correct order to ensure that program runs without 
error. Inefficient use of these models may result in undesirable effects that can severely 
limit performance, such as memory latency and mispredicted branches. 
To overcome the performance limitations of existing architectures, the Intel- 
designed IA-64 architecture employs innovative techniques and features. These 
techniques and features, including speculation, predication, large register files, register 
rotation, advanced branch architecture and 64-bit memory addressability, are combined to 
address the modern requirements of high end workstation and server applications. 
In order to analyze Intel IA-64 processor support for a secure virtual machine 
monitor, this chapter will provide a brief overview of Intel IA-64 architecture and its 
innovations. For more information about Intel IA-64 architecture, see the Intel's manuals 
[Ref. 1,2,3,4]. 
A.       INNOVATIONS OF THE IA-64 ARCHITECTURE 
The IA-64 architecture has several innovative features such as speculation, 
predication, branch architecture, register rotation and register stack. These features will 
be described below. 
1.        Speculation 
Memory latency is one of the performance limitations in standard architectures. 
In fact, memory speed is much slower than processor speed, and yet the processor must 
load data from memory as early as possible to guarantee that the data is available when 
needed. The IA-64 architecture allows a compiler to initiate loads much earlier, even 
before it is known that the information contained in these loads will be needed. This 
process is called speculation. The IA-64 architecture provides two types of speculation, 
data speculation and control speculation. 
a. Data Speculation 
Data speculation is the execution of a load instruction prior to a store that 
might write to the same memory address from which the load reads. Early scheduling of 
loads are critical because loads bring values from memory to registers. Memory values 
may be needed to start a computation in a program, therefore, loading memory values to 
registers must be performed as early as possible. Data speculative loads are also called 
advanced loads. 
To detect the address collisions between advanced loads and stores, a 
structure called Advanced Load Address Table (ALAT) is used by operating system. The 
code in Figure 1 below shows the data speculation of a load. When an advanced load 
(aload) is executed, an entry which contains the register tag, a portion of the physical 
memory address being loaded and the load access size in bytes, is inserted into the 
ALAT. When a store instruction is executed, the ALAT is searched in one of the two 
different ways: by physical address or by ALAT register tag, which is a unique number 
obtained from the physical target register number. If an entry with a matching physical 
address or register tag is found, it is deleted from the ALAT. 
When compiler executes with data speculation, it places a check instruction 
(acheck) at the original location of the load instruction. The check instruction searches 
the ALAT for the specified register tag or physical address. If ALAT contains an entry, 
then the data speculation was successful. If there is no ALAT entry, then the check 
instruction branches to recovery code that reloads the value and writes it into the target 
register. It is the compiler's responsibility to generate the recovery code if the 
speculative load fails. 
Normal code sequence; Data speculative code sequence; 
store (store address, data) aload (load address, target) 
load (load address, target) /* operations that use target */ 
use (target) store (store address, data) 
acheck (target, recovery address) 
use (target) 
Figure 1. Data Speculation After Ref. [1]. 
b. Control Speculation 
Control speculation is the execution of loads before the guarding branch 
instruction to hide memory latency. When the compiler encounters a branch instruction, 
the load is moved before the branch condition statement. This can cause undesired effects 
such as exceptions if the memory address is not valid. If memory access fails to occur 
when a speculative load executes, then a bit termed, "deferral token" is set in the target 
register. A deferral token for general registers is the 65th bit that is called "NaT" (Not a 
Thing) bit. A floating-point register uses special encoding for its deferral token called, 
"NatVal" (Nat a Thing Value). Arithmetic operations propagate the deferral token. As an 
example, a subtract operation of two general registers also performs a logical "or" 
operation on the NaT bit. If either one of the NaT bits of these registers is set, then the 
subtract operation sets the NaT bit of the destination register. Since, just the general 
registers and the floating-point registers have deferral tokens, destination registers other 
than general and floating-point registers cannot propagate NaT bits. The compiler 
therefore must not move the instructions to speculative locations if the destination is not a 
general or floating-point register. 
The code in Figure 2 below clarifies the control speculation process. When a 
compiler executes control speculation (sload), it puts a check instruction (scheck) at the 
original location of the load instruction. If the NaT bit of the target register is clear, then 
the control speculation was successful. If the NaT bit is set, then the check instruction 
branches to a recovery code. 
Normal code sequence; Control speculative code sequence; 
if(x==y) sload (load addressl, targetl) 
load (load address 1, tar get 1) sload (load addressl, targetl) 
else /* operations that use targetl and target!*/ 
load (load address!, target2) if(x==y) 
scheck (targetl, recovery addressl) 
else 
scheck (targetl, recovery address!) 
Figure 2. Control Speculation After Ref. [1]. 
2.        Predication 
Another  performance   limitation   for  existing   architectures   is   mispredicted 
branches. At run time, conditional branches are difficult to execute, because a processor 
must decide what instructions to fetch beyond a branch before it computes the condition 
for that branch. Predication is the conditional execution of the instructions, and removes 
branches and associated mispredicts. 
The code in Figure 3 below summarizes the predication process. The IA-64 
executes the conditional branch instructions (e.g., compare x==y) leading to a branch and 
puts the result, whether the comparision is true or false, in two one-bit predicate registers 
(e.g., pi and p2). These two predicate registers are the complement of each other. The 
execution of the branch depends on the predicate registers. If the predicate register is set, 
that is the result of comparision is true (pl=l, p2=0), then the instruction executes 
normally. If the predicate register is clear, that is the result of comparision is false (pl=0, 
p2=l), then the instruction does not execute, and control passes to the next instruction. 
Normal code sequence; Predicated code sequence; 
if(x==y) pi, p2 = compare (x==y) 
x=x+y (pi) x=x+y 
else (p2) x=x-y 
x=x-y 
Figure 3. Predication After Ref. [1]. 
3.        Branch Architecture 
Efficient execution of the branches is another critical performance issue. When a 
branch instruction is encountered, the processor fetches the next instruction from another 
address rather than the next sequential address. The IA-64 architecture defines two types 
of branches, indirect branches and instruction pointer (IP) relative branches. For IP 
relative branches, the IP is incremented by a signed 21-bit value (offset), provided from 
the encoding of the branch instruction opcode. For indirect branches, a value is assigned 
to the IP from one of the eight 64-bit branch registers, which is provided from the 
encoding of the branch instruction opcode. 
For optimization of branches, the IA-64 defines multi-way branches. If an 
instruction group has instructions after the branch instruction, then these instructions will 
execute only if the branch is not taken. In this way, a compiler can schedule compares 
and dependent branches in the same pipeline cycle. 
Traditional branches always mispredict the last iteration of a loop. If a loop 
executes five iterations, and the branch prediction mechanism mispredicts the last 
iteration, as a result, the prediction rate for this loop will be reduced, and this will reduce 
the effective speed of the processor. The IA-64 also provides special mechanisms for 
10 
loop closing branches for optimization purposes. A loop closing branch is implemented 
with the chop instruction. This instruction checks the Loop Count (LC) register which 
contains the number of iterations the loop will execute. If the register value is not zero, 
then the value is decremented by one and control passes back to the beginning of the 
loop. If the value is zero, then no action is taken, and control passes to the next 
instruction. This operation makes loop termination perfectly predictable. 
4.        Register Rotation 
Efficient handling of the loops is one of the important determiners of the 
processor's performance. The IA-64 provides register rotation for general registers 
(GRs), floating-point registers (FRs) and predicate registers (PRs) to be able to execute 
loop iterations in parallel rather than sequentially. The table below shows the static and 
rotating subsets of these registers. 
Register Name Static Registers Rotating Registers 
General Registers GR-0 through GR-31 GR-32 through GR-127 
Floating point Registers FR-0 through FR-31 FR-32 through FR-127 
Predicate Registers PR-0 through PR-15 PR-16 through PR-63 
Table 1. Static and Rotating Registers 
Register rotation allows loop optimization by scheduling multiple copies of the 
loop body together. A special register holds the register rotation base (RRB) which is 
used to rename the registers within the rotating subset of each register set. A reference to 
any register within the range of rotating subset is offset by the value of the RRB. For 
example, if the RRB has a value of 5, a reference to GR-32 would actually refer to GR- 
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37. The RRB value wraps the register values through the use of modulo arithmetic. 
Therefore the register values appear to rotate. 
Register rotation is the base of modulo-scheduling (i.e., new iterations can begin 
before previous iterations have finished.) Modulo-scheduling allows multiple loop 
iterations to be overlapped, and thus, increases parallelism. In a simple loop execution, 
the throughput is 2 cycles/word, and three instructions can execute in those two cycles. 
On the other hand, in a modulo-scheduled loop execution, the throughput is 1 cycle/word, 
and three instructions can execute each cycle. 







Stores     Loop Closing Branches 
ldl 
ld2 stl br.ctopl 
ld3 st2 br.ctop2 
ld4 st3 br.ctop3 
ld5 st4 br.ctop4 
st5 br.ctop5 
Figure 4. Modulo-Scheduled Loop Execution Sequence From Ref. [5]. 
A Modulo-scheduled loop contains three code sections: Prologue, Kernel and 
Epilogue. The prologue code fills the software pipeline. The software pipeline is 
analogous to hardware pipelining, but is created in code by the compiler. The Kernel 
code starts and finishes one iteration. The Kernel code is repeated for iteration counts 









Figure 5. Schedule of Modulo-Scheduled Loop From Ref. [5]. 
For counted loops, the IA-64 uses special loop branches (e.g., br.ctop instruction) 
and two application registers to determine the number of iterations required to drain the 
software pipeline. If LC>0, then LC is decremented by one and a branch is taken. When 
LC==0, the Epilog Count (EC) Register is tested. If EC>1, then EC is decremented by 
one and the branch is taken. When both LC and EC==0, the branch falls through. 
Combining register rotation and predication increases loop optimization. Figure 6 
shows the predicated modulo-scheduled loop execution sequence for n iterations. In the 
execution sequence, one predicate register (e.g., pi6) is initialized to one, the other 
predicate register (e.g., pl7) is initialized to zero. In the first cycle, the load executes but 
the store does not. In second cycle, after the first br.ctop executes, the predicates have 
been rotated so that the pl6 value is now in pl7. Also, br.ctop wrote one into pl6. This 
continues until cycle n is reached. In cycle n, LC has zero value and br.ctop still branches 
back because EC is not zero yet. The br.ctop writes zero into pl6 and pl7 still has a 
one, this combination has the effect of shutting off the load and allowing the final store. 
The IA-64 also provides optimizations for efficient modulo-scheduling of while 
loops. The IA-64 has a br.wtop instruction that executes a loop as long as a given 
predicate is one. When the branch predicate is zero, the branch continues to execute the 
loop while decrementing EC until EC==0. 
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Stage Predicate Predicate Value 
Cycle P16 P17 P16 P17 LC EC 
1 ldl br.ctop 1 0 n-1 2 
2 ld2 stl br.ctop 1 1 n-2 2 
3 ld3 st2 br.ctop 1 1 n-3 2 
n ldn stn-1 br.ctop 1 1 0 2 
n+1 stn br.ctop 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
Figure 6. Predicated Modulo-Scheduled Loop Execution Sequence From Ref. [5]. 
5.        Register Stack 
In the IA-64 architecture, general registers are divided into two subsets, a static 
subset and a stacked subset. Registers GR-0 through GR-31 are called static registers. 
The stacked registers are numbered from GR-32 through GR-127. The static subset must 
be saved and restored on context switches. The stacked subset is automatically saved and 
restored by the Register Stack Engine (RSE) which moves registers between the register 
stack and a storage location in memory. 
As a side effect of procedure calls and returns, the register stack is implemented 
by renaming the registers, that is, register access is accomplished by renaming the virtual 
register identifiers in the instruction through a base register into the physical register. By 
renaming the registers, there will be no need to spill (i.e., to write the register contents to 
memory), and fill (i.e., to write the memory contents back to registers), on subroutine 
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calls and returns. The callee can use available registers without spilling and restoring the 
caller's registers. 
'to* 
The registers in a stacked subset are called a register stack frame. The frame (sof) 
is divided into two parts: the local area (sol) and the output area (sof-sol). A callee 
procedure defines the size of its new stack frame using the alloc instruction. By using 
this instruction, the callee can allocate up to 96 registers per frame for input, output and 
local values. 
Figure 7 describes the behavior of the register stack on a procedure call from 
procedure A to procedure B. The behavior of the register stack is shown at four points: 
prior to the call, immediately after the call, after callee (procB) executed an alloc 
instruction, and after return. After a call, the Current Frame Marker (CFM) is copied to 
the Previous Frame Marker (PFM) field in the Previous Function State application 
register. The new frame's local area size is set to zero, and the size of the callee's output 
area (output Bl) is set to the size of the caller's output area (output A), thus allowing 
parameters to be passed with no register copying. 
15 
Instruction Execution 
Caller's Frame (procA) 
Callce's Frame (procB) 
After call 
Callee\s Frame (procB) 
After alloc 
Caller's Frame (procA) 
After return 
Stacked GRs 
32 46            52 
Local A Output A 
< ' 1 ► 
So!a=M       : 




<p2 48 50 




J46       52 
Local A Output A 
Frame Makers 
CFM PFM 
,Sfl] sot ..sol  sof, 
14    21 14   21 
Figure 7. Register Stack Behavior During Procedure Call and Return From Ref. [1]. 
6.        Other Innovations 
IA-64 architecture has several other innovations and features, including: 
• Support for binary compatibility with the IA-32 instruction set. 
• Support for Instruction Level Parallelism that has the ability to execute 
multiple instructions at the same time. 
• Mechanisms for the compiler to communicate with the processor about 
compile time information. 
• Multimedia instructions. 
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B.       APPLICATION REGISTER STATE 
IA-64 contains a rich set of registers available to application programs. The 
names of these registers and their functions are described below. 
1. General Registers (GRs) 
IA-64 contains a set of 128 general registers, each of them has 64 bits of data 
storage and one NaT bit. General registers are used for integer and integer multimedia 
operations. When executing an IA-32 instruction set, general registers 8 through 31 
contain the IA-32 integer, segment descriptor and segment selector registers. 
2. Floating-Point Registers (FRs) 
IA-64 contains a set of 128 floating-point registers, each of them has 82 bits. 
These registers are used for all floating-point operations. 
3. Predicate Registers (PRs) 
IA-64 has a set of 64 predicate registers, each of them has one bit. Predicate 
registers are used for conditional execution of instructions. The results of IA-64 compare 
instructions are held in these registers. 
4. Branch Registers (BRs) 
There are 8 branch registers in IA-64 architecture, each of them has 64 bits. 
These registers contain IA-64 branching information and provide branch target addresses 
for indirect branches. 
5. Instruction Pointer (IP) 
In the IA-64 architecture, three instructions are grouped together into 128-bit 
containers called bundles. The instruction pointer (IP) contains the address of the bundle 
that holds the currently executing instruction.   The IA-64 instruction bundles are 16 
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bytes, and are 16-byte aligned.   Therefore, the least significant 4 bits of DP are always 
zero. 
6. Current Frame Marker (CFM) 
The Current Frame Marker contains the state of current stack frame. On a 
subroutine call, the CFM is copied to the Previous Frame Maker (PFM) field in the 
Previous Function State Register which holds information about previous state. The 
PFM is saved and restored for every procedure in case it gets modified, such as by 
subsequent subroutine calls. This provides each general register stack frame with a 
different frame marker. 
7. Performance Monitor Data Register 
This register is used to obtain performance information for execution of both IA- 
64 and IA-32 instructions. 
8. User Mask (UM) 
This register is used to control memory access alignment and byte ordering that 
defines whether loads and stores use little-endian or big-endian byte ordering. It is also 
used to enable or disable the user-configured performance monitor used to analyze both 
hardware and software performance. Lastly, it holds IA-64 floating-point register state 
modifications. 
9. Processor Identification Registers 
These registers are also called CPUID. CPUID registers 0 and 1 contain vendor 
information. CPUID register 2 is an ignored register.   CPUDD register 3 contains version 
information and CPUDD register 4 provides general application level information about 
IA-64 features. It is a set of flag bits that shows if a given IA-64 is supported in the 
processor model. 
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10.      Application Registers 
The IA-64 provides a rich set of special purpose data and control registers for 
processor functions visible to applications. 
Figure 8 shows the IA-64 application register file. 
C.       SYSTEM REGISTER STATE 
The system registers of the IA-64 architecture are privileged system registers 
used for debugging, process control, protection, handling interrupts, and performance 
monitoring. The names of these registers and their functions are described below. 
1. Processor Status Register (PSR) 
This is 64-bit register that holds the control information for the currently 
executing IA-64 or IA-32 process. 
2. Control Registers (CRs) 
The IA-64 has several control registers that hold the current state of process and 
global processor parameters for interrupt handling and memory management. Figure 9. 
shows all the control registers. 
3. Debug Breakpoint Registers (DBR/IBR) 
An IA-64 operating system can program 64-bit data and 64-bit instruction 
breakpoint register pairs to invoke faults on references to physical and virtual addresses 
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Figure 8. Application Register Set From Ref.[l]. 
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4. Performance Monitor Configuration/Data Registers (PMC/PMD) 
These registers can be programmed to measure application, operating system and 
processor performance. 
5. Banked General Registers 
IA-64 uses GR-16 through GR-31 as banked general registers. Banked general 
registers provide immediate register context for low level interrupt handlers (i.e., TLB 
miss handler). Upon interrupt, the processor switches general registers GR-16 through 
GR-31 to register bank 0. 
6. Region Registers (RRs) 
Eight 64-bit region registers hold the region identifier (RED) values and preferred 
page sizes for virtual to physical address mappings. 
7. Protection Key Registers (PKRs) 
Sixteen 64-bit protection key registers hold the protection keys and read, write 
and execute permissions for protection domains. These registers provide a register cache 
for the protection keys required by a process. The operating system is responsible for 
management and replacement policies of these registers. 
8. Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) 
The translation lookaside buffer holds the virtual and physical address mappings 
that are currently in use. 
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Figure 9. System Register Set From Ref. [2] 
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D.       ADDRESSING AND PROTECTION 
1.        Memory Models and Virtual Addressing 
Operating Systems are generally built on one of two virtual memory models, the 
multiple address space model (MAS) or the single address space (SAS) model. 
In MAS models, each process has a unique address space, whereas in SAS 
models, more than one process can exist within the same virtual address space. 
The IA-64 architecture defines virtual regions to support both the MAS and SAS 
models. Each processor implements 224 virtual regions, each 261 bytes in size. The three 
most significant bits of the virtual address selects one of eight regions. The operating 
system maps these eight regions onto the system's 224 possible regions through region 
identifiers which are loaded into eight region registers before the process executes. These 
registers are saved and restored during context switches. Region identifiers can be 
thought of as address space identifiers for MAS systems, or as the most significant 
address bits of 285 bytes of global virtual address space for SAS systems. 
Figure 10 shows the process of mapping a virtual address onto a physical address. 
On a memory reference, a virtual region number (VRN) selects one of the eight region 
registers which contain RIDs. The virtual page number (VPN) and RID work together to 
search the TLB for a translation entry. If a match is found in the translation lookaside 
buffer (TLB), then the translation entry in the TLB is used. The entry's physical page 
number (PPN) is concatenated to page offset bits to form the physical address. If a 
matching entry is not found, the processor may optionally search the virtual hashed page 
table (VHPT). 
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VHPT exists in two forms. The first, region-based VHPT short format, uses an 8- 
byte entry format and is directly indexed by the VPN. This format is generally used to 
support a per region linear page table configuration. The second, long format VHPT, uses 
32-byte entry format and is indexed by a hash function. This format is suitable for a 
single large virtual hash page table. Figure 11 shows the sequence of the TLB and VHPT 
search. 
2.        Protection Mechanisms 
The IA-64 architecture provides four types of protection mechanisms [Ref. 6]. 
These mechanisms are addressability, privilege level, access rights and protection 
domains. Each will be discussed below. 
Addressability is a protection mechanism such that one process cannot access the 
memory address of another process. As mentioned before, each process is assigned a RID 
which points to a memory space for that process. Manipulation of RIDs by trusted 
software restricts one process from addressing the memory space of another process. The 
operating system can grant shared access to a particular region by assigning the same 
RID to the processes. It is the responsibility of the operating system to use protection 
keys to manage multiple accesses to a shared page with different access rights. 
Four privilege levels are defined in the IA-64 architecture, numbered from zero to 
three, to control access to system resources. Level zero is the most privileged, while 
level three is the least privileged. Level zero is the only level from which the privileged 
instructions can be executed. 
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Figure 10. Virtual Address Translation From Ref. [2]. 
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On each memory reference, the current privilege level field in the processor 
status register (PSR.cpl) is compared with the privilege level field of the page's TLB 
entry (TLB.pl). If the PSR.cpl privilege level is less than or equal to that of the TLB.pl, 
access is granted. 
The third protection mechanism, access rights, determines the read, write and 
execute permissions for the page. If access is granted to the page (i.e., PSR.cpl <= 
TLB.pl), the access rights field of the TLB entry (TLB.ar) define the read, write and 
execute permissions to the page. 
These three protection mechanisms, discussed so far, are applied to MAS systems. 
In addition to addressability, privilege level and access rights protection mechanisms, the 
IA-64 also provides protection domains. The protection domain mechanism is a critical 
feature of SAS systems. In a single global address space, different protection domains 
can be created by enabling protection key registers (PSR.pk=l). On a memory reference, 
a key in the TLB entry associated with the referenced page is compared with the keys in 
the 16 protection key registers associated with the process. If a match is found, access is 
granted to the page as long as it is of a type (read, write and execute) which is allowed by 
the wd, rd, xd fields of protection key registers. Since the operating system controls the 
contents of the protection key registers, it can change the access privileges of all the 
pages in a domain by changing the contents of any protection key register. 
3.        Memory Attributes 
When virtual addressing is enabled, the memory attributes field in the TLB 
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Figure 11. TLB/VHPT Search From Ref. [2]. 
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policy attributes of the page. If a page is speculative, the processor performs load 
accesses without taking into account prior control dependencies. A page can be 
cacheable or uncacheable. If it is cacheable, the processor can copy the corresponding 
physical memory in all levels of the processor memory or cache hierarchy. 
Write back cacheable pages must only modify the processor's copy of the 
physical memory, written data must be passed to the memory when the processor's copy 
is displaced. The coalescing attribute for uncacheable pages states that, multiple stores to 
this page may be gathered in a coalescing buffer and issued later as a single store 
operation. 
When physical addressing is enabled, the 63rd bit of the address defines the 
memory attributes of the page.   If the 63rd bit is zero, memory attributes of the page are 
cacheable, write-back and limited speculation. If it is one, memory attributes of the page 
are uncached, non-coalescing and non-speculative. 
E.        CONTEXT MANAGEMENT 
Intel's IA-64 manual [Ref. 2] states context management and state preservation 
rules as described below. 
1.        Procedure Calls 
Register preservation between procedures occurs in a way that, 
• The caller saves GRs 2-3, GRs 8-11, GRs 14-15, Grs 16-31, FRs 6-15 
and FRs 32-127. 
• The callee saves GRs 4-7, FRs 2-5 and FRs 16-31 
• GRs 32-127 are preserved by the Register Stack Engine (RSE) 
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• GR 0 is always zero. FR 0 is always +0.0 and FR1 is always +1.0. 
• GR 1, GR 12 and GR13 have special uses. 
2. Thread Switches Within The Same Address Space 
When the operating system switches threads within the same address space, the 
following steps are taken. 
• GRs, FRs, PRs, BRs and ARs are saved and restored. 
• Memory ordering operations are performed. Memory ordering must 
satisfy read-after-write (RAW), write-after-read (WAR), and write- 
after-write (WAW) data dependencies to the same memory location. 
3. Address Space Switching 
When the operating system switches the address space, the following steps are 
taken. 
• GRs, FRs, PRs, BRs and ARs are saved and restored. 
• Memory ordering operations are performed. Memory ordering must 
satisfy read-after-write (RAW), write-after-read (WAR), and write- 
after-write (WAW) data dependencies to the same memory location. 
• PKRs of the outbound address space are saved and then invalidated. 
• DCRs of the outbound address space are saved. 
• RRs of the outbound address space are saved. 
• RRs of the inbound address space are restored. 
• DCRs of the inbound address space are restored. 
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•    PKRs of the inbound address space are restored. 
F.       IA-32 APPLICATIONS IN IA-64 SYSTEM ENVIRONMENT 
The IA-64 architecture supports an IA-32 system environment. At any time, the 
processor can execute either IA-64 or IA-32 instructions. When the instruction set field 
of a processor status register (PSR.is) is zero, the IA-64 instruction set is executing. 
When this field is set to one, the IA-32 instruction set is executing. 
Virtual addresses within both IA-64 and IA-32 instruction set can point the same 
physical memory location. While IA-64 instructions directly generate 64-bit virtual 
addresses, IA-32 instructions generate 16 or 32-bit effective addresses. These effective 
addresses are converted into 32-bit virtual addresses by IA-32 segmentation. Then, 32-bit 
virtual addresses are converted into 64-bit virtual addresses by zero extention. Finally, 
IA-64 memory management mechanisms translate virtual addresses generated by either 
instruction set into physical addresses. 
The IA-64 architecture defines three special instructions and interruptions which 
give a transition between IA-64 and IA-32 instruction sets. 
• A jmpe instruction is an IA-32 instruction that changes the instruction set to 
IA-64. 
• A br.ia instruction is an IA-64 instruction that changes the instruction set to 
IA-32. 
• rfi (return from interruption) instruction is used to return to IA-64 or IA-32 
instruction set after handling an interrupt. 
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All interrupts change the instruction set to the IA-64 instruction set for 
handling of interrupts. 
IA-64 Reg IA-32 Reg Convention Size Description 
General Purpose Integer Registers 
GRO constant 0 
GR1-3 undefined scratch for IA-32 execution 
GR4-7 unmodified IA-64 preserved registers 
GR8 EAX 
IA-32 state 

















GR18-23 undefined scratch for IA-32 execution 
GR24 ESD IA-32 state 64 IA-32 segment descriptors (register 
format) 
GR25-26 undefined scratch for IA-32 execution 
GR27 DSD 







GR32-127 undefined IA-32 code execution space 
Process Environment 
IP IP shared 64 Shared IA-32 and IA-64 virtual 
instruction pointer 
Floating-point Registers 
FRO constant +0.0 
FR1 constant+1.0 
FR2-5 unmodified IA-64 preserved registers 
FR6-7 undefined IA-32 code execution space 
FR8 MMO/FPO 
IA-32 state 64/80 
IA-32 MMX technology registers 
(aliased on 64-bit FP mantissa) 










IA-32 state 64 
IA-32    streaming    SIMD    Extension 
registers low order 64-bits of XMMO 
are mapped to FR16{63:0} 
High   order   64-bits   of  XMMO   are 








FR32-127 undefined IA-32 code execution space 
Predicate Registers 
PRO constant 1 
PR1-63 undefined IA-32 code execution space 
Branch Registers 
BRO-5 unmodified IA-64 preserved registers 






not used for IA-32 execution, 




CCV undefined 64 IA-32 code execution space 
UNAT unmodified not used for IA execution, IA-64 
preserved register 
FPSR.sfO unmodified IA-64 numeric status and controls 




64 IA-32 numeric status and tag word and 
Streaming SMD Extension status 
FCR FCW,MXCSR 64 IA-32 numeric  and  Streaming SIMD 
Extension control 
FIR FOP,FIP,FCS 64 IA-32 x87 numeric environment opcode, 
code selector and IP 
FDR FEA,FDS 64 IA-32 x87 numeric environment data 
selector and offset 
ITC TSC shared 64 Shared IA-32 time stamp counter (TSC) 
and IA-64 Internal Timer 
PFS 
unmodified 
Not used for IA-32 code execution, prior 
EC is preserved in PFM 





32 IA-32 System/Arithmetic flags, writes of 
some   bits   condition   by   CPL   and 
EFLAG.iopl. 
CSD CSD 64 IA-32 code segment (register format) 
SSD SSD IA-32 code segment (register format) 
CFLG CR0/CR4 64 IA-32 control flags 
CR0=CFLG{ 31:0} ,CR4=CFLG{ 63:32}, 
Writable at CPL=0 only. 
T able 2. IA-32 App lication Register Ma; 
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:>ping From Ref. [1] 
IA-64 instructions can use all IA-64 and IA-32 application registers. (The 
mapping of an IA-32 register set to an IA-64 register set is shown in Table 2). 
When executing IA-64 instructions, segmentation is disabled, and only virtual 
addresses are used. When executing IA-32 instructions within the IA-64 system 
environment, only IA-32 application registers are visible; IA-64 application and control 
registers cannot be accessed. Mapping of virtual addresses to physical addresses is 
accomplished through IA-64 memory management and I/O port references. 
After analyzing the IA-64 architecture, now it will be convenient to introduce the 
virtual machine and virtual machine monitor concepts. 
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HI.    VIRTUAL MACHINE MONITORS 
Rapid technological growth have transformed computer systems from single 
purpose systems into today's multi-access, multi-programming, multi-processing systems. 
Hence, this is a need for a single powerful computer system that can simulate multiple 
computers with different operating systems. In today's computer world, virtual machines 
have been used to address this need by providing multi-environment systems. 
This chapter will discuss virtual machines (VMs) and virtual machine monitors 
(VMMs), the characteristics and logical modules of a VMM, and will give information 
about each type of VMM. Also, hardware and software requirements for each type of 
VMM will be given. 
A.       WHAT ARE VIRTUAL MACHINES? 
Simply defined, a virtual machine is an identical and efficient copy of a real 
machine. Each VM can be considered a separate operating system platform. 
There are many benefits to using a VM while making a program think that it is 
running on a "real machine." First, it is possible to execute privileged programs step by 
step on a virtual machine. Thus, virtual machines provide an environment for interactive 
debugging of an operating system. Current real machines seldom have an operator 
console thru which to examine the system state but this facility can be constructed 
relatively easily using a virtual machine monitor. 
Second, virtual machines allow users to test new versions of an operating system. 
New versions of an operating system running on a virtual machine can be tested 
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separately. Therefore, a user can test the new versions of an operating system but not 
have to completely reboot entire system from scratch. 
Third, virtual machines can be used to upgrade an operating system and its 
applications. While running the original operating system in a virtual machine exactly as 
it did on the real machine, the upgraded operating system runs in a separate virtual 
machine. This prevents the corruption of the original operating system. 
Fourth, virtual machines allow users to run programs in a virtual environment that 
may have different environment configurations from those of the real machine (i.e., the 
amount of memory or the input-output devices attached). This allows a user to run 
applications on different environments without having to use another real machine. 
Finally, virtual machines allow multiple operating systems to be run on the same 
computer concurrently. For example, a user can run Windows 98, Windows NT, Linux 
etc. concurrently on the same computer. This allows users to develop applications for 
different operating systems much more easily. Since several operating systems may run 
on the same computer concurrently, a user can test his applications on many operating 
systems, using just one computer. 
B.        PURPOSE OF A VMM 
A VMM is a software program that mediates between the virtual machine and the 
real machine. The VMM manages the real resources and allocates these resources to the 
VMs as needed. Goldberg defines a VMM as, "a hardware-software duplicate of a real 
existing computer system in which a statistically dominant subset of the virtual 
processor's instructions execute on the host processor." [Ref. 7]. 
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1. Characteristics of VMM 
A VMM has three essential characteristics [Ref. 8]. First, the VMM provides an 
environment for the VMs which is identical to the real environment. Here, the real 
environment determines a complete computer system. There may be some differences 
between the VM's environment and real environment caused by the timing dependencies 
and the availability of system resources. 
Second, a VMM is efficient in that the real processor executes a statistically 
dominant subset of the virtual processor's instructions without VMM interpretation. A 
VMM simulates the effect of only those instructions which trap. 
A third characteristic is that a VMM has complete control of the real system 
resources. For a virtual processor, it is only possible to access real system resources if 
the real system resources are explicitly allocated to the virtual processor by the VMM. In 
order to prevent a virtual machine from taking control of the real machine, the virtual 
machine must be run in user mode, and must not be permitted to put the real machine into 
a mode which allows the virtual machine to execute privileged instructions. Once the 
VMM allocates the resources to a virtual processor, it is then possible for the VMM to 
regain control of these allocated resources. So, the VMM will be able to allocate real 
system resources to other VMs as well, when needed. 
2. Modules of a VMM 
A VMM consists of three sets of modules, a dispatcher, an allocator, and an 
interpreter. The dispatcher is the top-level control module that decides which module to 
call when a trap occurs. When a VM attempts to execute a privileged instruction, the VM 
traps to the dispatcher, and the dispatcher invokes the allocator.   An allocator is the 
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second module that controls the system resources. It is the allocator's responsibility to 
avoid giving the same resources to more than one virtual processor simultaneously. The 
third in the set of modules is the interpreter. Each privileged instruction has an 
interpreter that is used to simulate the effect of the instruction that caused a trap. 
3.        Types of VMMs 
There are three types of VMMs: Type I VMM, Type II VMM, and Hybrid VMM 
(HVM). 
Every process contains instructions that will be executed on hardware. The ratio 
of the number of instructions that execute directly on hardware to those that must be 
emulated in software determines if a machine is a Complete Software Interpreter 
Machine (CSIM), a real machine, a VMM or an HVM. All of the CSIM instructions 
execute by software interpretation, no CSEVI instruction executes directly on a real 
processor. Therefore, a CSIM is not a VMM. Examples of CSIM include the Java byte 
code interpreter [Ref. 9] and the Transmeta Crusoe chip which provides binary code 
translation from one instruction set to another [Ref. 10]. Nor is a real machine a VMM 
since all the instructions execute directly on the real hardware, and no software 
interpretation is required. Although, the execution of a statistically dominant subset of the 
virtual processor's instructions on a real machine is an implementation requirement for 
VMMs, exactly how the VMM takes control of the instructions to be interpreted is not 
specified and can vary from one type of VMM to another. For example, a Type I VMM 
and a Type JJ VMM are distinguished from each other according to how the VMM gains 
control of the instructions to be interpreted. 
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A Type I VMM runs directly on a real machine. Figure 12 (below) shows the 
structure of a Type I VMM. A Type I VMM can be treated as an operating system that is 
responsible for providing an execution environment and resource allocation for VMs. 
Since a Type I VMM is responsible for resource allocation and provides an execution 
environment, this type of VMM may be more complex, and may include more code than 
a Type II VMM. For a Type I VMM, when sensitive, privileged instructions are 
executed in a VM, they cause a trap to the VMM. Then, the VMM will execute a code 







Type I VMM 
Hardware (Real Machine) 
Figure 12. Illustration of a Type I VMM 
In contrast, a Type II VMM runs as an application under a host operating system. 
In other words, a Type II VMM runs as an extended machine and only provides 
virtualization services. A Type II VMM is illustrated in Figure 13. The host operating 
system handles the resource allocation and provides the extended environment for the 
VMM. When sensitive, privileged instructions are executed in a VM, they cause a trap to 
the host operating system.   Then the host operating system gives control to the VMM 
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Figure 13. Illustration of a Type II VMM 
An Hybrid Virtual Machine (HVM) is identical to a VMM.    The major 
differences between an HVM and a VMM are that in a HVM, all privileged instructions 
are interpreted by software, while in a VMM, privileged instructions can execute directly 
on the real processor. 
C.        HARDWARE   &   SOFTWARE   REQUIREMENTS   OF   VMMS   FOR 
VIRTUALIZATION 
In the previous sections, three types of VMM are defined. In the following 
sections, hardware and software requirements for each type of VMM will be discussed. 
A processor's job is to execute instructions. Since the real processor and the 
virtual processor are identical, some of the virtual machine's instructions can be executed 
directly on the real processor without VMM interpretation. However, some virtual 
machine  instructions  cannot be executed directly on  the  real  processor.     These 
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instructions are called sensitive instructions [Ref. 7]. When sensitive instructions are 
executed, the state of the real processor is changed, sensitive registers as well as sensitive 
memory locations are essentially altered. Therefore, sensitive instructions can cause 
interpretation problems and interfere with the underlying VMM if they are executed 
directly by a VM. Clearly, the key to implementing a VMM is to prevent the execution 
of sensitive instructions directly on the real processor. 
Some Intel IA-32 and IA-64 instructions are privileged, meaning that, if they are 
not executed in privilege level zero, they cause a general protection exception. In 
general, a VMM is executed in supervisor mode, and a VM is executed in user mode. 
When a VM attempts to execute a privileged instruction, a trap to the VMM occurs. In 
this manner, the VMM can simulate the effect of the instruction that caused the trap and 
then return control to the VM. 
In order to support a VMM, a processor must be able to be virtualized. If all the 
sensitive instructions of a processor are also privileged, then the processor is said to be 
"virtualizable". This means all sensitive, privileged instructions will trap to the VMM. 
After trapping, the VMM will simulate the effect of the sensitive, privileged instruction 
for the VM. On the other hand, sensitive, non-privileged instructions may cause 
interference with the proper operation of multiple VMs. So, the VMM must examine 
each instruction before execution to ensure that it is not a sensitive, non-privileged 
instruction. When the VMM encounters a sensitive instruction, the VM must be forced to 
trap to the VMM. 
In   the   following   sections,   the   hardware   and   software   requirements   for 
virtualization will be analyzed for each type of VMM. , 
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1. Hardware Requirements for a Type I VMM 
As discussed earlier, a Type I VMM runs on a real machine and performs 
resource allocation and systems scheduling. Goldberg developed three hardware 
requirements for virtualization in order to implement a Type I VMM on a processor's 
hardware [Ref. 7]. These three requirements are: 
(1) For a large subset of instructions, the method of executing non-privileged 
instructions in both supervisor and user modes must be roughly equivalent. 
(2) There must be a mechanism, such as a protection system or address 
translation system that protects the real machine and virtual machines from the active VM. 
(3) There must be a method of automatically signaling the VMM when the 
virtual machine attempts to execute a sensitive instruction. Then, it must be possible for 
the VMM to simulate the effect of this instruction. Sensitive instructions include: 
(a) Those instructions that change or reference the mode of the virtual 
machine or the state of the machine. 
(b) Those instructions that change or read the sensitive registers or 
memory locations. 
(c) Those instructions that reference the storage protection system or 
address relocation system. 
(d) All input-output instructions. 
2. Software Requirements for a Type II VMM 
Recall that a Type II VMM runs under a host operating system rather than on a 
real machine. Since the host operating system must provide primitives that make it 
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possible to implement a Type II VMM on a processor's hardware, Goldberg introduced 
three software requirements for a host operating system that will complement the 
hardware requirements and must be met in order to build a Type II VMM on a processor 
[Ref. 7]. These software requirements are: 
(1) The host operating system cannot invalidate the requirement that specifies 
that for a large subset of instructions, the method of executing non-privileged instructions 
in both supervisor mode and user mode must be roughly equivalent. 
The hardware requirement 1 is still applicable for the host operating system and is 
not affected by the insertion of an operating system between a VMM and hardware, and 
is therefore still needed. 
(2) There must be a primitive available in the host operating system, such as 
an address translation primitive, a protection primitive or a sub-process primitive to be 
able to protect the VMM and other virtual machines from the active VM. 
The hardware requirement 2 for Type I VMM is modified since the VMM will be 
running on an extended and insulated machine controlled by the host operating system 
that, likely, will prevent the VMM from utilizing a protection and address translation 
system. Therefore, there must be a system primitive that can be invoked by the VMM to 
simulate the effects of sensitive, privileged instructions. 
(3) There must be a primitive available in the host operating system to direct 
the signal from the host operating system to the VMM when a VM attempts to execute a 
sensitive instruction. Then, it must be possible for the VMM to simulate the effect of the 
sensitive instruction. 
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Since the VMM and the host operating system are two separate system 
components, hardware requirement 3 for Type I VMM is modified so that all of the VM 
traps will be directed from the host operating system to the VMM. 
3.        Hybrid VMM 
The Hybrid VMM (HVM) executes all non-privileged instructions directly on the 
processor while interpreting all privileged instructions in software. 
The hardware requirements for a Type I VMM are changed to support a 
virtualizable HVM such that, 
(1) Requirement 1, (i.e, for a large subset of instructions, the method of 
executing non-privileged instructions in both supervisor mode and user mode must be 
roughly equivalent), is eliminated. 
(2) Requirement 3a, (i.e., there must be a method of automatically signaling 
the VMM when the virtual machine attempts to execute a instruction which changes or 
references the mode of the virtual machine or the state of the machine) is weakened. 
Only unprivileged instructions which change or reference the mode of the virtual 
machine or the state of the machine must be identified since all privileged instructions are 
interpreted by software. 
The other hardware requirements for a Type I VMM are still valid for an HVM. 
This thesis will focus on the analysis of the Intel IA-64 processor support for a 
secure VMM or HVM. Previous analyses have indicated that, a secure implementation 
of a VMM will likely be a Type I VMM or HVM [Ref. 7]. This thesis will not analyze 
the software requirements for the host operating system for implementing a VMM. 
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This chapter defined each type of VMM and their hardware/software 
requirements for virtualization. Now, we will move on to analyze the Intel IA-64 
architecture and instruction set to see if it is able to support any type of VMM. 
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IV.    THE INTEL IA-64 ARCHITECTURE'S CAPABILITY TO 
SUPPORT A VIRTUAL MACHINE MONITOR 
This chapter will analyze the capacity of Intel IA-64 architecture to support a 
virtual machine monitor by using the hardware requirements described in Chapter IE. 
Each member of the Intel IA-64 instruction set will be examined to find whether or not it 
supports virtualization. 
Like most of the other processors, the IA-64 architecture was not designed to 
support virtual machines. Therefore, whether or not the IA-64 architecture supports a 
virtual machine monitor is a "hit-or-miss proposition". 
The hardware requirements for virtualization are given in Chapter HI. Recall that 
any instruction that violates the hardware requirements 1, 2, 3a, 3b, 3c or 3d prevents the 
processor from running a Type I VMM or a Type II VMM. Also, any instruction that 
violates the hardware requirements 2, 3a (weaker form), 3b, 3c or 3d prevents the 
processor from running a HVM. As such, any instruction that violates the hardware 
requirements 2, 3a (weaker form), 3b, 3c or 3d makes a processor non-virtualizable. 
Before examining each IA-64 instruction, the IA-64 architecture will be analyzed 
to see if it meets three main requirements. The first requirement states that for a large 
subset of the instructions, the method of executing non-privileged instructions in both 
supervisor and user modes must be roughly equivalent. The IA-64 architecture meets this 
requirement because there is no difference between the methods of executing instructions 
in supervisor and user modes. 
The second requirement states that there must be a mechanism, such as a 
protection system or address translation system that protects the real and virtual machines 
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from the active VM. IA-64 architecture meets this requirement. As described in Chapter 
II, the IA-64 architecture defines virtual regions to support both MAS and SAS models. 
Each processor implements 224 virtual regions and each process can have up to eight 
regions. The operating system maps these regions through region identifiers, loaded into 
region registers before the process executes. 
A process cannot reference the regions of other processes unless the operating 
system allows shared access to that region. This mechanism is the addressability 
protection mechanism. Privilege level and access rights are the other two protection 
mechanisms. On each memory access, PSR.cpl is compared with the TLB.pl. If 
PSR.cpl <= TLB.pl, access is allowed to the page. When access is granted to the page, 
the access rights field of the TLB entry (TLB.ar) defines the read, write and execute 
permissions to the page. 
In addition to addressability, privilege level and access rights protection 
mechanisms, the IA-64 architecture also provides protection domains. In a single global 
address space, different protection domains can be created by enabling protection key 
registers (PSR.pk=l). On a memory reference, a key in the TLB entry associated with the 
referenced page is compared with the keys in the 16 protection key registers. If a match is 
found, access is granted to the page as long as it is of a type (read, write and execute) 
which is allowed by the wd, rd, xd fields of protection key registers. While the access 
rights bits associated with each translation provide privilege level-granular access to a 
page, protection keys permit domain-granular access to a page. 
The third requirement states that there must be a method of automatically 
signaling the VMM when the virtual machine attempts to execute a sensitive instruction. 
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Then, it must be possible for the VMM to simulate the effect of this instruction. The IA- 
64 architecture uses interrupts, faults and traps that cause the flow of control to be passed 
to an interrupt handling routine when an unprivileged task executes a privileged 
instruction. However, the IA-64 instruction set contains sensitive, unprivileged 
instructions. Since the unprivileged instructions do not generate an interrupt, fault or 
trap, the VMM will not simulate the effect of the instruction. These instructions prevent 
the IA-64 architecture from being virtualizable. 
In the following section, each of the IA-64 architecture's instructions (documented 
as of July 2000 [Ref. 3]) will be examined, and those that violate hardware virtualization 
requirements will be discussed in detail. 
A.       EXAMINATION OF THE IA-64 INSTRUCTION SET 
Table 3 (below) contains all of the IA-64 instructions found in the Intel IA-64 
instruction set reference [Ref. 3]. The CODE column shows the name of the instruction. 
The DESCRIPTION column gives the short description of the instruction, and the SENS 
column indicates whether the instruction is sensitive. The PRTV column indicates 
whether the instruction is privileged. The PROB column shows whether the instruction 
prevents virtualization, and the REAS column indicates why the instruction causes a 
problem for virtualization. The meaning of the abbreviations used in REAS column is 
provided below. 
3al : References or changes the mode of the processor. 
3a2 : References or changes the state of the processor. 
3b 1 : References or changes sensitive registers. 
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3b2 : References or changes sensitive memory locations. 
3c 1 : References or changes privilege level. 
3c2 : References the memory system. 
3c3 : Interferes with address translations. 
3d: I/O instructions. 
CODE DESCRIPTION SENS PRIV PROB REAS 
add Add N N N - 
addp4 Add Pointer N N N - 
alloc Allocate Stack Frame N N N - 
and Logical And N N N - 






Loop Branch N N N - 
br.call Procedure Call Y N Y 3cl 
br.ret Procedure Return Y N Y 3c 1 
br.ia Invoke IA-32 Instruction Set Y N Y 3al 
break Break N N N - 
brp Branch Predict N N N - 
bsw Bank Switch Y Y N - 
chk Speculation Check N N N - 
clrrrb Clear RRB N N N - 
emp Compare N N N - 
cmp4 Compare Word N N N - 
empxehg Compare and Exchange Y N Y 3c 1 
cover Cover Stack Frame Y N Y 3b 1 
czx Compute Zero Index N N N - 
dep Deposit N N N - 
epc Enter Privileged Code N N N - 
extr Extract N N N - 
fabs Floating-point Absolute Value N N N - 
fadd Floating-point Add N N N - 
famax Floating-point Absolute 
Maximum 
N N N - 
famin Floating-point Absolute 
Minimum 
N N N - 
fand Floating-point Logical And N N N - 
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fandcm Floating-point And 
Complement 
N N N - 
fc Flush Cache Y N Y 3cl 
3c2 
fchkf Floating-point Check Flags N N N - 
fclass Floating-point Class N N N - 
fclrf Floating-point Clear Flags N N N - 
fcmp Floating-point Compare N N N - 
fcvt.fx Convert Floating-point to 
Integer 
N N N - 
fcvt.xf Convert Signed Integer to 
Floating-point 
N N N - 
fcvt.xuf Convert Unsigned Integer to 
Floating-point 
N N N - 
fetchadd Fetch and Add Immediate Y N Y 3cl 
flushrs Flush Register Stack N N N - 
fma Floating-point Multiply Add N N N - 
fmax Floating-point Maximum N N N - 
fmerge Floating-point Merge N N N - 
fmin Floating-point Minimum N N N - 
fmix Floating-point Mix N N N - 
fmpy Floating-point Multiply N N N - 
fms Floating-point Multiply 
Subtract 
N N N - 
fneg Floating-point Negate N N N - 
fnegabs Floating-point Negate 
Absolute Value 
N N N - 
fnma Floating-point Negative 
Multiply Add 
N N N - 
fnmpy Floating-point Negative 
Multiply 
N N N - 
fnorm Floating-point Normalize N N N - 
for Floating-point Logical Or N N N - 
fpabs Floating-point Parallel 
Absolute Value 
N N N - 
fpack Floating-point Pack N N N - 
fpamax Floating-point Parallel 
Absolute Maximum 
N N N - 
fpamin Floating-point Parallel 
Absolute Minimum 
N N N - 
fpcmp Floating-point Parallel 
Compare 
N N N - 
fpcvt.fx Convert Parallel Floating-point 
to Integer 
N N N 
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fpma Floating-point Parallel 
Multiply Add 
N N N - 
fpmax Floating-point Parallel 
Maximum 
N N N - 
fpmerge Floating-point Parallel Merge N N N - 
fpmin Floating-point Parallel 
Minimum 
N N N - 
fpmpy Floating-point Parallel 
Multiply 
N N N - 
fpms Floating-point Parallel 
Multiply Subtract 
N N N - 
fpneg Floating-point Parallel Negate N N N - 
fpnegabs Floating-point Parallel Negate 
Absolute Value 
N N N - 
fpnma Floating-point Parallel 
Negative Multiply Add 
N N N - 
fpnmpy Floating-point Parallel 
Negative Multiply 
N N N - 
fprcpa Floating-point Parallel 
Reciprocal Approximation 
N N N - 
fprsqrta Floating-point Parallel 
Reciprocal Square Root 
Approximation 
N N N 
frcpa Floating-point Reciprocal 
Approximation 
N N N - 
frsqrta Floating-point Reciprocal 
Square Root Approximation 
N N N - 
fselect Floating-point Select N N N - 
fsetc Floating-point Set Controls N N N - 
fsub Floating-point Subtract N N N - 
fswap Floating-point Swap N N N - 
fsxt Floating-point Sign Extend N N N - 
fwb Flush Write Buffers N N N - 
fxor Floating-point Exclusive Or N N N - 
getf Get Floating-point Value or 
Exponent or Significand 
N N N - 
invala Invalidate ALAT N N N - 
itc Insert Translation Cache Y Y N - 
itr Insert Translation Register Y Y N - 
Id Load Y N Y 3c 1 
ldf Floating-point Load Y N Y 3cl 
ldfp Floating-point Load Pair Y N Y 3c 1 
lfetch Line Prefetch Y N Y 3c 1 
3c2 
loadrs Load Register Stack N N N - 
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mf Memory Fence N N N - 
mix Mix N N N - 
mov ar Move Application Register Y Y N - 
movbr Move Branch Register N N N - 
mover Move Control Register Y Y N - 
movfr Move Floating-point Register N N N - 
movgr Move General Register N N N - 
mov imm Move Immediate N N N - 
mov 
indirect 
Move Indirect Register Y Y N - 
movip Move Instruction Pointer N N N - 
movpr Move Predicates N N N - 
mov psr Move Processor Status 
Register 
Y Y N - 
mov urn Move User Mask Y N Y 3b 1 
movl Move Long Immediate N N N - 
mux Mux N N N - 
nop No Operation N N N - 
or Logical Or N N N - 
pack Pack N N N - 
padd Parallel Add N N N - 
pavg Parallel Average N N N - 
pavgsub Parallel Average Subtract N N N - 
pemp Parallel Compare N N N - 
pmax Parallel Maximum N N N - 
pmin Parallel Minimum N N N - 
pmpy Parallel Multiply N N N - 
pmpyshr Parallel Multiply and Shift 
Right 
N N N - 
popent Population Count N N N - 
probe Probe Access ■ Y N Y 3cl 
psad Parallel Sum of Absolute 
Difference 
N N N - 
pshl Parallel Shift Left N N N - 
pshladd Parallel Shift Left and Add N N N - 
pshr Parallel Shift Right N N N - 
pshradd Parallel Shift Right and Add N N N - 
psub Parallel Subtract N N N - 
ptc.e Purge Translation Cache Entry Y Y N - 
ptc.g, 
ptc.g 
Purge Global Translation 
Cache 
Y Y N - 
ptc.l Purge Local Translation Cache Y Y N - 
ptr Purge Translation Register Y Y N - 
rfi Return from Interrupt Y Y N - 
rsm Reset System Mask Y Y N - 
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rum Reset User Mask Y N Y 3bl 
setf Set Floating-point Value, 
Exponent or Significand 
N N N - 
shl Shift Left N N N - 
shladd Shift left and Add N N N - 
sladdp4 Shift Left and Add Pointer N N N - 
shr Shift Right N N N - 
shrp Shift Right Pair N N N - 
srlz Serialize N N N - 
ssm Set System Mask Y Y N - 
St Store Y N Y 3c 1 
stf Floating-point Store Y N Y 3c 1 
sub Subtract N N N - 
sum Set User Mask Y N Y 3b 1 
sxt Sign Extend N N N - 
sync Memory Synchronization N N N - 
tak Translation Access Key Y Y N - 
tbit Test Bit N N N - 
thash Translation Hashed Entry 
Address 
N N N - 
tnat Test NaT N N N - 
tpa Translate to Physical Address Y Y N - 
ttag Translation Hashed Entry Tag N N N - 
unpack Unpack N N N - 
xchg Exchange Y N Y 3cl 
xma Fixed-point Multiply Add N N N - 
xmpy Fixed-point Multiply N N N - 
xor Exclusive Or N N N - 
zxt Zero Extend N N N - 
Table 3. IA-64 Instruction Set Analysis 
B.        INSTRUCTIONS      THAT      VIOLATE      THE      VISUALIZATION 
REQUIREMENTS 
1.        Branch Instructions 
In the IA-64 architecture, branches can be either IP-relative or indirect. For IP- 
relative branches, the target address is encoded in the branch instruction as a signed- 
immediate displacement. For indirect branches, the target address is obtained from the r2 
field of branch register ( BR-r2). 
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IA-64 architecture has several branch types. These branch types are: br.call, 
br.ret, br.ia, br.cloop, br.ctop, br.cexit, br.wtop, br.wexit. The branch types that violate 
the virtualization requirements will be explained below. 
a. br.call Instruction 
When the br.call instruction executes, if the predicate register value is set, 
the branch is taken, otherwise branch is not taken. If the branch is taken several actions 
occur; the current values of the CFM, the EC and the current privilege level (cpl) are 
saved in the previous function state application register. 
The br.call instruction prevents virtualization because this instruction 
references the privilege level in the system. Normally, the operating system of the virtual 
machine (VMOS) does not execute at privilege level zero. Rather, the operating system 
executes at the application level (privilege level three). Thus, all privileged instructions 
will cause traps to the VMM. However, operating systems assume that they are running 
at privilege level zero. This assumption may cause a problem if the VMOS executes the 
br.call instruction and a branch is taken. When the VMOS examines the cpl field in the 
processor status register to save the current privilege level into the previous function state 
register, the VMOS will find that its privilege level is not zero. This is a problem because 
the process may halt. 
b. br.ret Instruction 
The reason that the br.ret instruction prevents virtualization is similar to 
that explained in the previous paragraph. When the br.ret instruction executes, the CFM, 
the EC and the current privilege level are restored from the previous function state 
register.   The privilege level is restored if the return does not lower the privilege level. 
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Since the VMOS assumes that it is running at privilege level zero, after restoring cpl and 
examining the privilege level, the process may halt upon finding that the VMOS is not 
operating at privilege level zero. 
c. br.ia Instruction 
The br.ia instruction invokes the IA-32 instruction set by setting the 
PSR.is field to one, and begins execution of IA-32 instructions at the virtual linear target 
address obtained from BR-2. 
This instruction prevents virtualization because it changes the mode of the 
processor. While the processor is executing the IA-32 instruction set, only IA-32 
application register file is visible to the processes. Table 2 in Chapter II shows the IA-32 
application register mapping. IA-32 real, VM86 and protected mode segmentation is in 
effect. Segment protection checks and virtual address generation are applied according to 
IA-32 segmentation rules. 
However, in the IA-64 system environment, user-level instructions can 
modify all descriptors and selectors including GDT and LDT. Modifications of the LDT 
and GDT cause problems, because, within the IA-32 system environment, the GDT and 
LDT are privileged operating system segmentation tables and can be accessed only at 
privilege level zero [Ref. 2]. 
Also, previous analyses have indicated that the IA-32 instruction set has 
seventeen instructions that violate the virtualization requirements [Ref. 11]. Therefore, 
switching the instruction set from IA-64 to IA-32 will provide a system environment in 
which these seventeen instructions can execute. 
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2.        cmpxchg, fetchadd, xchg Instructions 
The cmpxchg instruction reads a value from memory starting at the address 
specified by the value in GR-r3 field. The value is zero extended and then compared 
with contents of the compare and exchange value register (CCV). If the two are equal, 
then the least significant bytes of the value in GR-r2 are written to memory starting at the 
address contained in GR-r3. The zero extended value is placed in GR-rl, the NaT bit 
corresponding to GR-rl is cleared. 
The xchg instruction reads a value from memory starting at the address specified 
by the value in GR-r3. The least significant bytes of the value in GR-r2 are written to 
memory starting at the address contained in GR-r3. The zero extended value is placed in 
GR-rl, the NaT bit corresponding to GR-rl is cleared. 
The fetchadd instruction reads four or eight bytes from memory starting at the 
address specified by the value in GR-r3. The value is zero extended and added to the 
sign extended immediate value specified by the operand. The least significant four or 
eight bytes of the sum are written to memory starting at the address specified by the value 
in GR-r3. The zero extended value is placed in GR-rl, the NaT bit corresponding to GR- 
rl is cleared. 
Using the protection mechanisms for the IA-64 architecture described in Chapter 
II, all memory references are checked before allowing access. The TLB.ar, TLB.pl fields 
and privilege levels of the access (PSR.cpl) determine the IA-64 access to a page. 
These instructions violate the hardware virtualization requirement because they 
all reference the privilege level in the system. When these instructions execute, both read 
and write access privileges are required for the referenced page.   Recall that TLB.ar, 
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TLB.pl and PSR.cpl fields defines read, write and execute accesses to a page. Consider 
the following scenario. A VM, running at privilege level three, wants to reference a 
memory address. To get the access rights for the referenced page, the PSR.cpl field will 
be examined. Then, the VM will find that it is not running at privilege level zero, at 
which it assumes to run. This may halt the process. 
3. cover Instruction 
This instruction allocates a new stack frame of zero size. If interrupt collection is 
enabled (PSR.ic=0), then the old value of the CFM is copied to the interrupt function 
state register (IFS). 
This instruction is a problem for virtualization because it changes the contents of 
EFS, which is a sensitive interrupt register. IFS can only be accessed at privilege level 
zero. When a VM running at privilege level three executes this instruction, since this 
instruction is not privileged, a trap to the VMM will not occur and the VMM will not be 
able to simulate the behavior of this instruction for the VM. 
4. probe Instruction 
The probe instruction is used to determine whether read or write access to a given 
virtual address is allowed with the current privilege level. This instruction can also be 
used to probe with lower privilege level. 
The probe instruction references the system privilege level. When the probe 
instruction executes, the current privilege level is referenced in order to determine read or 
write access to a given virtual address. Since a VM normally operates at privilege level 
three, privilege checks once again become a problem when the VM is not running at the 
highest privilege level at which the VMOS assumes itself to be running. 
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5. fc, lfetch Instructions 
The IA-64 data memory hierarchy is composed of zero or more levels of cache 
between the memory and the register files. 
The/c instruction invalidates the cache line that contains at least 32-bytes of data, 
associated with the address obtained from the value of GR-r3, from all levels of the 
processor data memory hierarchy. 
The lfetch instruction moves a line of data (32-bytes or more) containing the 
address specified by the value in GR-r3 to the highest level of the data memory hierarchy. 
These instructions prevent virtualization because they reference the memory 
system by invalidating the cache lines and moving the lines in the memory hierarchy. 
Also, these instructions reference privilege level. When executed at privilege level zero, 
the fc does not perform any access rights or protection key checks, but does perform 
access rights checks at other privilege levels. When the lfetch executes, the memory read 
operation is described by the memory attribute of the accessed page. Again, the privilege 
level checks may cause problems for the VMs that assume themselves to be running at 
privilege level zero. 
6. Id, ldf, ldfp, st, stf Instructions 
The Id instruction reads a value from memory starting at the address specified by 
the value in GR-r3. Then, the value is zero extended and placed in GR-rl. The ldf 
instruction reads a value from memory starting at the address specified by the value in 
GR-r3. Then, the value is converted into the floating-point register format and placed in 
FR-rl. The ldfp instruction reads eight or sixteen bytes from memory starting at the 
address specified by the value in GR-r3.  By encoding the instruction, the value read is 
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treated as integer/parallel, floating-point data or a contiguous pair of floating-point 
numbers. Each number is converted into the floating-point register format. The value at 
the highest address is placed in FR-r2, the value at the lowest address is placed in FR-rl. 
These instructions inhibit visualization because they all reference the privilege 
levels in the system. When these instructions execute, a memory reference check is 
performed. In order to load a value from memory, a process should have enough 
privilege and access rights to reference that page. If a VM running at privilege level 
three wants to load a value from memory, the privilege level of the access will be 
examined. Upon finding that the privilege level is not zero (i.e., the level which VMOS 
expects), the process may halt. 
The st instruction writes the value in GR-r2 to memory, starting at the address 
specified by the value in GR-r3. On the other hand, the stf instruction writes the value in 
FR-r2 to memory, starting at the address specified by the value in GR-r3. 
The reason that the st and stf instruction prevent virtualization is similar to that for 
the load operation. Again, when these instructions execute, a memory reference check is 
performed, and VMOS will find that it is not operating at the expected privilege level. 
7.        mov um, sum, rum Instructions 
The mov urn instruction has two forms: (1) the move from user mask form copies 
the zero-extended contents of the user mask (PSR {5:0}) into GR-rl; and (2) the move to 
user mask from copies the 5-bits of GR-r2 {5:0} into the user mask. 
The rum instruction takes the complement of the immediate operand and performs 
a logical AND operation with the user mask. The result is placed in the user mask. 
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Conversely, the sum instruction performs a logical OR operation between the 
immediate operand and the user mask, and places the result in the user mask. 
These instructions prevent virtualization because all of them reference sensitive 
registers. The user mask is a subset of the processor status register (PSR {5:0}), and 
controls memory access alignment, byte-ordering and user-configured performance 
monitors. 
The contents of the user mask are not saved and restored at context switching. 
When a process executes one of these instructions, since these are sensitive but not 
privileged instructions, the VMM cannot simulate the behavior of this instruction for the 
VM. This will cause unexpected results for the VM. 
C.       CONCLUSION 
After examining each instruction of the Intel IA-64 instruction set, 18 instructions 
(detailed in Table 5) are found to make the IA-64 architecture non-virtualizable. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
REASON OF VIOLATION 
3al 3a2 3b 1 3b2 3cl 3c2 3c3 3d 
br.call, br.ret, 
cmpxchg, probe, 
fetchadd, xchg, Id, 
ldf, ldfp, st, stf 
X 
fc, lfetch X X 




Tab! e 4. Insti Tictionsr rhat Vio ate Hare ware Re quiremei nts 
This analysis indicates that the Intel IA-64 architecture is not virtualizable 
according to the hardware requirements introduced by Goldberg. 
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V.      COMPARISON WITH OTHER PROCESSORS 
Analysis of the IA-64 instruction set has shown that the IA-64 architecture is not 
virtualizable. However, some virtualization techniques can be used to virtualize the IA-64 
architecture. 
This chapter will discuss several architectures and virtualization techniques that 
might be applicable to virtualizing the IA-64 architecture. Architectures which will be 
analyzed include the VAX security kernel, Intel 80x86, DISCO and Alpha. 
A.       THE VAX SECURITY KERNEL 
Developed by the Digital Equipment Corporation, the VAX security kernel is the 
result of a research effort that resulted in a Type I VMM for the VAX architecture [Ref. 
12]. The system's hardware, software and microcode are designed to meet Trusted 
Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) Al-level security requirements [Ref. 13]. 
The VAX security kernel runs on the VAX 8530, 8550, 8700, 8800 and 8810 processors, 
creates virtual VAX processors (each of which runs either the VMS or the ULTRTX-32 
operating systems), and provides isolation and controlled sharing of sensitive 
information. 
The VAX security kernel is primarily a security kernel rather than a VMM. 
Therefore, certain features of the VMMs, such as self-virtualization and debugging of one 
VM from another were not implemented in the VAX security kernel to reduce kernel 
complexity. 
A security kernel is an implementation of the reference monitor concept and 
includes hardware, firmware and software [Ref. 14]. The reference monitor is an 
abstraction that enforces authorized subject access to objects in the system. An Object is 
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a passive entity that contains or receives information. Access to an object means access 
to the information it contains. On the other hand, a subject is an active system entity such 
as a process that causes information to flow among objects. The reference monitor has 
three implementation requirements: 
(1) Completeness: The reference monitor must be invoked on every access 
request of a subject to an object. 
(2) Isolation: The reference monitor and its database must be protected from 
unauthorized modifications. 
(3) Verifiability: The reference monitor must be well structured, small, simple 
and understandable, so that it can be subject to test and analysis to ensure that it performs 
all its functions properly. 
The VAX security kernel applies mandatory and discretionary access controls to 
virtual machines. The kernel assigns an access class that contains a secrecy class and an 
integrity class to virtual machines. The secrecy class is based on the Bell and LaPadula 
security model [Ref. 14]. The Bell and LaPadula Model defines a policy for secrecy that 
restricts read and write access between a subject and an object based upon the 
relationship between the subject's access class and object's access class. The two 
properties of the Bell and LaPadula Model are: 
(1) Simple Security Property (No read-up): A subject may have read access to 
an object only if the subject's access class is equal to or greater than the object's access 
class. This property ensures that secret labeled users can read secret, confidential and 
unclassified information, but cannot read top-secret information. 
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(2) * - Property (No write-down): A subject may have write access to an 
object only if the subject's access class is equal to or less than the object's access class. 
This property is required to prevent malicious software from writing down. For example, 
if a secret user uses a system that does not enforce the * - Property, a Trojan horse could 
read the secret information and write that information to unclassified files. 
Policies related to the integrity or modification are often represented by the Biba 
security model [Ref. 14]. The Biba security model defines a policy for integrity that 
addresses the unauthorized modification of sensitive information by restricting read and 
write access between a subject and an object. To restrict read and write access between a 
subject and an object, the Biba Model uses integrity levels and integrity compartments. 
The two properties of Biba Model are: 
(1) Simple Integrity Property (No write-up): A subject can have write access 
to an object only if the subject's integrity class is equal to or greater than the object's 
integrity class. This property ensures that a low integrity subject will not modify high 
integrity data. 
(2) * - Property (No read-down): A subject can have read access to an object 
only if the subject's integrity class is equal to or less than the object's integrity class. 
This property ensures that the high integrity subject will not read low integrity data. 
The VAX security kernel also supports the access control lists (ACLs) to be able 
to apply discretionary access controls to virtual machines. ACLs provide a list of 
subjects authorized to access a particular object. 
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Users and virtual machines are the two kinds of subjects in the VAX security 
kernel. A user communicates with a process called a server through a trusted path. 
Servers are trusted processes. The user's minimum and maximum classes, the terminal's 
minimum and maximum access classes, the user's discretionary access rights and 
privileges, and the privileges exercisable from the terminal all determine what the server 
can do for the user. A virtual machine runs a virtual machine operating system (VMOS), 
and is an untrusted subject. A user may write a program for execution inside a VM and 
may corrupt the VMOS without affecting the security kernel. A virtual machine could 
only affect the other VMs with shared disk volumes. Virtual machines can also be 
considered as objects because a user may want to connect to a VM. Then the security 
kernel establishes a connection between the user and the VM. 
When a user logs into the security kernel, the VMM establishes a session between 
the user and the user's server. When the user wants to connect to a VM, the user uses the 
CONNECT command to the server and specifies the name of the VM. If the connection 
is authorized, the user's existing connection with the server is suspended, a new session 
between the user and the requested VM is established by the security kernel. 
The VAX security kernel also supports objects such as real devices, disk and tape 
volumes and security kernel files. The real devices consist of disk drivers, tape drivers, 
printers, terminal lines. These devices contain or transmit information and must be 
controlled by Trusted Computing Base (TCB), that is, all the protection mechanisms 
within a computer system. Disk and tape volumes are another kind of objects. The 
contents of some disk volumes are controlled by a VM. Other disk volumes are VAX 
security kernel volumes which cannot be accessed by a VMOS.   VAX security kernel 
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volumes contain VAX security kernel files, which hold long term system databases, such 
as an audit log. These files are the part of the TCB, and the VM cannot reference them 
with the exception of the audit and error logs and crash dump files. VAX security kernel 
files can also be used to create virtual disk volumes. 
To reduce its overall complexity, the VAX security kernel has been implemented 
by using the levels of abstraction approach. Each layer in the system implements some 
abstraction in part by making calls to lower layers. Making lower layers unaware of 
higher abstractions reduces the number of interactions, thus the complexity. Table 6 
contains the name of each layer and brief descriptions [Ref. 11]. 
Highly secure systems are often hard to use because of their limited user interfaces. As a 
reference monitor concept requirement, the security kernel must be small and verifiable. 
Normally, interface features are large and hard to verify. Therefore, such features cannot 
be included in the security kernel. To overcome this problem, the designers created two 
separate command sets, secure server and secure commands. The secure server 
commands such as connect, disconnect, resume and show sessions are commands that 
control terminal connections to virtual machines. The secure commands help manage the 
system. 
The VAX architecture was not virtualizable. Therefore, some virtualization 
techniques were used to make the VAX processor virtualizable. The extensions made to 
the VAX processor's architecture and to the processor microcode to support 
virtualization are described below [Ref. 12]. These techniques would be applicable to 
virtualizing the IA-64. 
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Layer Name Definition 
Users Includes untrusted application programs that run on the 
VMOS and humans who communicate with the secure 
server through the trusted path. 
VMOS The virtual machine's operating system. 
Secure Server Implements the trusted path for the security kernel, logs 
users in and out, provides security-related administrative 
functions; everything above this layer is untrusted. 
Virtual VAX Completes the virtualization process by emulating sensitive 
instructions and delivering interrupts and exceptions to the 
virtual machine. 
Kernel Interface Implements virtual controllers for virtual I/O devices and 
the security function controller. 
Virtual Printers Implements virtual printers for each VM and multiplexes 
the real physical printers among virtual printers. 
Virtual Terminals Implements virtual terminals for each VM and manages 
physical terminal lines. 
Volumes Implements VAX security kernel and exchangeable 
volumes and provides registries of all subjects and objects. 
Files-11 Files Implements a subject of the ODS-2 file system. 
Auditing Provides the facilities for security auditing and alarms. 
Higher-Level Scheduler Creates the abstraction of level-two virtual processors 
(vp2s); dedicated vp2s are used by the Secure Server layer 
and bindable vp2s are used by virtual machines. 
VM Virtual Memory Implements the shadow page tables that are needed to 
support virtual memory in virtual machines. 
VM Physical Memory Manages real physical memory and assigns it to virtual 
machines. 
I/O Services Implements device drivers that control the real I/O devices. 
Lower-Level Scheduler Creates the abstraction of level-one virtual processors 
(vpls) that are the basic unit of scheduling for the system; 
vpls are intended to be very inexpensive processes for use 
within the kernel. 
Hardware-Interrupt 
Handler 
Immediately above the VAX hardware and modified 
microcode; contains the interrupt handlers for the various 
I/O controllers and certain CPU-specific code. 
Table 5. Layers In The VAX Security Kernel Design From [Ref. 9]. 
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1.        Ring Compression 
Ring compression is the most significant and security-relevant architectural 
change that virtualizes the protection rings [Ref. 15]. Ring compression is implemented 
in software. The rings of the virtual VAX processor are mapped to the rings of the real 
processor in such a way that ring 0 (kernel) and ring 1 (executive) of the VM are mapped 
to ring 1 (executive) of the real processor. Virtual user and supervisor rings are mapped 
to real user and supervisor rings, respectively. Ring compression was accomplished by 
making three extensions to the VAX architecture and modifying the sensitive instructions 
to make use of these extensions. There extensions include: 
(1) Addition of a VM mode bit to the processor status longword (PSL<VM>) 
(2) Definition of a new register called the VM processor status longword 
register (VMPSL) 
(3) Definition of the VM-emulation exception 
When the processor is executing in a virtual machine, the PSL<VM> bit is set. 
PSL<VM> is set only by software and is cleared only by microcode when an interrupt 
occurs. Software reading the PSL, whether in the virtual machine or in the virtual 
machine monitor, will have no opportunity to reveal that PSL<VM> is set. 
Instructions either trap to the VMM security kernel for simulation of their effects 
or obtain their information from the VMPSL that contains the virtual ring number (rather 
than the real ring number). 
The compression of the executive and kernel rings in the virtual machines has no security 
impact on the VMM since the VMM security kernel runs only in real kernel mode, and 
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no virtual machine can access real kernel mode pages. However, ring compression could 
affect security within a virtual machine since the virtual machine's kernel mode is no 
longer protected from its executive mode. 
2.        Sensitive Instructions 
The VAX architecture does not meet the hardware virtualization requirements. 
Some instructions including move processor status longword (MOVPSL), change-mode 
(CHM), probe (PROBE) and return from exception or interrupt (REI) are sensitive, but 
are not privileged instructions. Also, unprivileged instructions can read and modify the 
contents of page table entries (PTEs), which are sensitive data structures. 
To overcome this problem and support virtualization, designers made some 
underlying changes to the VAX architecture as described above. Additionally, designers 
also changed the microcode to address the virtualization problems caused by sensitive 
unprivileged instructions. These changes will be discussed below [Ref. 15]. 
The MOVPSL instruction reads the processor status longword. The MOVPSL 
instruction was implemented in microcode. If PSL<VM>=0, MOVPSL returns the real 
PSL. If PSL<VM>=1, MOVPSL returns the VMPSL. This instruction always produces 
correct results and never traps. 
The CHM instruction switches to a mode of equal or higher privilege. Four CHM 
instructions (CHMU, CHMS, CHME, CHMK) were defined to cause a VM-emulation 
trap when executed in VM mode, allowing the VMM to do the proper stack pointer and 
stack manipulation, examine the VM's system control block (SBC) which contains a list 
of addresses of interrupt handling routines, and transfer the CHM exception to the VM. 
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The REI instruction switches to a mode of equal or lower privilege. REI is one of 
the most complex instructions in the VAX architecture. Because of its complexity, REI 
emulation is done in software, but some useful sanity checks were left in microcode. The 
REI instruction replaces the entire PSL, therefore, the VMM must pack together the new 
PSL's current mode and previous mode fields and then switch to the proper VM stack. 
The PROBE instruction is used to determine if access to a page of memory is 
allowed. In the modified VAX, PROBE reads the shadow page table entry (PTE) which 
contains the real physical page numbers and translated protection fields corresponding to 
the VM's page table entries. If the shadow PTE is valid, PROBE uses the protection 
fields and checks the requested access without trapping to the VMM. If the shadow PTE 
is not valid, PROBE traps to the VMM which updates the shadow PTE based on the 
VM's page table. 
3.        I/O Emulation 
Traditional virtual machine monitors (e.g., IBM's VM/370) virtualize not only 
the CPU, but also the I/O hardware. Virtualized I/O hardware allows the VMOS to run 
unmodified. The VAX I/O hardware is difficult to virtualize because its I/O devices are 
programmed to read and write control and status registers (CSRs) in the I/O space of the 
physical memory. 
To overcome this problem, the VAX security kernel I/O interface used a kernel 
call mechanism. In essence, the virtual machine stores I/O related parameters in its I/O 
space and executes a move to privileged register (MTPR) instruction to a special kernel 
call (KCALL) register. Then, MTPR traps to the security kernel and the I/O operation is 
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performed.  Because of the special kernel I/O interface, special untrusted virtual device 
drivers must be written for all VMOS. 
B.        INTEL 80X86 ARCHITECTURE 
Intel 80x86 architecture was used to design high-assurance trusted systems such 
as Gemini Trusted Network Processor [Ref. 16], XTS-300 [Ref. 17], and Boeing MLS 
Lan [Ref. 18] during the 1980's and early 1990's. 
The 80x86 architecture has many mechanisms that provide benefits for 
constructing secure systems. These mechanisms include: multiple operating modes (e.g., 
protected, virtual-8086, real); segment protection (e.g., gates); multitasking (e.g., task 
state segments, task switching); paging (e.g., address space management, per-page 
protection); input/output protection (e.g., I/O instructions), control flags and debug 
registers [Ref. 19]. 
The four hardware protection rings of the Intel architecture provide benefits for 
secure system construction. The protection rings solve three important problems of a 
general-purpose system to be used as a computer utility [Ref. 20]. First, a user can create 
arbitrary and protected subsystems which can be used by other users. Second, the 
supervisor code can be implemented in layers enforced by the hardware. Third, the user 
can protect himself while debugging his own programs. 
The hardware components of a computer system are said to operate securely if 
they are used correctly.     However,  analysis of the Intel  80x86 processor family 
architectures has shown that Intel architecture has some "pitfalls"  [Ref.  19]. The 
architectural pitfalls are not security flaws but can cause security flaws if these pitfalls are 
not handled by the operating system correctly. Most of the architectural pitfalls discussed 
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are timing and storage covert channels. A covert channel transfers information from one 
process to another, although, transfer of the information is not expected. 
The pitfalls include the TS flag, FPU context, segment accessed bit, segment 
attributes, page access visibility, internal register visibility, debug register values, time 
stamp counter, performance counters, cache and TLB timing channels and undefined 
values. These pitfalls were found in the early version of the 80x86 architecture (such as 
the 386 and 486), but most of them still remain in the current Pentium architecture. 
In addition to the pitfalls listed above, the 80x86 have 102 reported flaws, 17 of 
which are security relevant and nine of which are denial of service flaws [Ref. 19]. 
System designers should consider these pitfalls when developing secure operating 
systems for the 80x86 architecture. 
In his thesis, Robin analyzes the Intel Pentium's capability to support a secure 
virtual machine monitor [Ref. 11]. He concludes that even though the Intel architecture 
is not virtualizable, a product called FreeMWare (renamed plex86) provides something 
similar to a Type II VMM for the Intel architecture. However, none of the VMMs for the 
Intel architecture should be considered a secure VMM. 
In the following paragraphs, several techniques proposed by Lawton [Ref. 21] to 
make the Intel architecture virtualizable, are described . These techniques are also useful 
for virtualization of the IA-64. 
1.        Pure Emulation 
Pure emulation is modeling the complete x86 PC in software to run x86 operating 
systems and applications on non-x86 platforms. This method is used in a project called 
Bochs [Ref. 22]. Bochs is much more like a complete software interpreter machine rather 
73 
than a VMM. Bochs emulates a large part of the CPU, related AT hardware and the 
BIOS, and allows DOS, Windows'95, Minix 2.0 and other x86 operating systems to be 
run on both x86 and non-x86 platforms. Bochs can run on Sparc, MIPS and PowerMac. 
The advantage of the pure emulation technique is its portability. However, this 
technique has the disadvantage of significant performance degradation since no 
instructions are executed directly on the hardware. 
2. OS/API Emulation 
OS/API Emulation is the second technique proposed by Lawton. In a computer 
system, applications communicate with the operating system via a set of APIs. OS/API 
emulation is a technique that allows applications designed for a different x86 operating 
system to run by intercepting and emulating the behavior of the API mechanisms in the 
operating system. The Wine project used this technique. Wine is "an implementation of 
the Windows 3.x and Win32 API on top of X and Unix" [Ref. 23]. Using the OS/API 
emulation technique, application binaries can be run natively, that is, Windows 
executable files can be run in a Unix environment without any alteration. Running 
application binaries natively provides very good performance. But, OS/API emulation is 
only applicable to running x86 operating systems for which the APIs are known and have 
been emulated. 
3. Virtualization 
The third technique is called virtualization. In general, system features such as 
the segmentation model, protection mechanisms, and the paging unit of IA32 CPU, are 
designed to be used by only one operating system. Usually, the large set of instructions 
would cause no problems when running multiple operating systems on hardware.   The 
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virtualization technique allows the larger set of compatible instructions to execute 
natively. The smaller set of incompatible instructions (i.e., sensitive, unprivileged 
instructions) need to be detected, and their expected behavior must be emulated by the 
VMM. 
In the virtualization technique, the instructions are analyzed until one of the 
following is encountered: 
(1) An instruction which cannot be run natively (problem instruction); 
(2) A branch instruction; or, 
(3) The address of an instruction, which has been analyzed previously. 
For the first two conditions, a breakpoint must be installed at the beginning of the 
problem instruction or branch instruction. If case three is encountered, no action is 
necessary since the instruction has been analyzed already. 
Code is allowed to run natively, and continues to run until it encounters a 
breakpoint. If the reason for the breakpoint is a problem instruction, the behavior of this 
problem instruction is emulated by the VMM. If the reason for the breakpoint is a branch 
instruction, it is necessary to analyze instructions at the branch target address. Branch 
instructions must be dynamically controlled to ensure that execution does not branch to 
code that has not been analyzed. If the target address has already been analyzed, and 
marked as OK, then the branch instruction can be marked as OK. 
The virtualization technique also addresses the possibility that some instructions 
which write to memory may write into the addresses of instructions which have been 
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marked as OK. Page tables are used to write protect any page of memory in which the 
code has been analyzed and marked as OK. 
As a summary, the Intel x86 architecture is not truly virtualizable. A product 
called plex86 (formerly called FreeMWare) provides something similar to a Type II 
VMM for the Intel x86 architecture. However it is not a good approach to implement a 
secure VMM as a Type II VMM. Since a Type II VMM runs as an application under a 
host operating system, a highly secure host operating system has to be written for the x86 
architecture. 
C.       THE DISCO ARCHITECTURE 
Another virtual machine monitor implementation is the DISCO prototype, which 
is also a useful guide to how the IA64 architecture virtualization might be accomplished. 
DISCO is an implementation of a Type I VMM, and was developed at Stanford 
University for the FLASH multiprocessor [Ref. 24]. 
The flash multiprocessor consists of a set of nodes each containing a processor, 
main memory, and I/O devices. The nodes are connected together with a high- 
performance interconnect. Although it is designed for the FLASH multiprocessor, 
DISCO is also available on a number of machines, such as Convex Exemplar, Silicon 
Graphics Origin2000, Sequent NUMAQ and Data General NUMALiine. 
DISCO emulates privileged instructions, the memory management unit, and the 
trap architecture and allows unmodified applications and operating systems to run on the 
virtual machine. DISCO provides an abstraction of main memory located in a contiguous 
physical address space starting at address zero. For virtualization of I/O devices such as 
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disks, network interfaces, clock and periodic interrupt timers, DISCO intercepts all 
communication to and from I/O devices to emulate the behavior. 
Some of the key aspects of DISCO implementation which would be applicable to 
the virtualization of the Intel IA-64 architecture will be described below [Ref. 24]. 
1.        Virtual CPUs 
Generally, there is only one processor in a computer system. In a virtual machine 
monitor environment, multiple virtual machines can run on the same processor. 
Therefore, each VM has a virtual processor that leads the VM and VMOS to think that 
the virtual machine is running on the real processor. 
In the DISCO project, the execution of the virtual CPU is emulated by using 
direct execution on the real processor. In order to schedule a virtual CPU, DISCO sets 
the registers of the real machine to those of the virtual CPU and jumps to the program 
counter of the virtual CPU. Direct execution allows the operations to run at the same 
speed as they would on the real processor. A challenge of using direct execution is the 
detection and fast emulation of those operations caused by the execution of privileged 
instructions. 
For each virtual CPU, a data structure that functions like a process table entry in 
a traditional operating system is kept. This data structure contains the register values, 
TLB contents and other state information of a virtual CPU when it is not running on the 
real CPU. A VM trap causes the virtual CPU to run on the real CPU and causes the 
virtual machine monitor to emulate the behavior of the trap on the currently scheduled 
virtual processor.   DISCO contains a simple scheduler that arranges the time-sharing 
usage of the real processor by virtual processors.     The information of the currently 
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scheduled VM is saved when the time period is up and the next virtual processor is 
swapped into the real processor. 
2. Virtual Physical Memory 
DISCO uses an additional level of address translation and maintains physical-to- 
machine address mappings to virtualize physical memory. Virtual machines use a 
physical address that starts at address zero and continues for the size of the virtual 
machine's memory. In the DISCO prototype, physical-to-machine translation is done by 
using the software reloaded TLB of the MIPS processor. Insertion of a virtual-to- 
physical mapping into the TLB by the operating system requires emulation of this 
insertion operation by translating the physical address into the associated machine 
address and inserting this machine address into the TLB. 
3. Virtual I/O Devices 
To virtualize I/O devices, the VMM must intercept all device accesses from 
virtual machines and forward these device accesses to physical devices. The DISCO 
designers have found that it is easier to use one universal device driver for each type of 
device rather than to use a real device driver of every device. Each device defines a 
"monitor call" which is used to pass all command arguments to the VMM in a single trap. 
Devices such as disks and network interfaces require a direct memory access (DMA) map 
as their arguments. The VMM must intercept such DMA requests and translate a 
physical address into a machine address. Then device drivers interact directly with the 
physical device. 
4. Virtual Network Interface 
Virtual machines use standard distributed protocols such as network file system 
(NFS) to communicate with each other. DISCO has designed a virtual subnet that allows 
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communication between the virtual machines.   The virtual subnet and interfaces use 
copy-on-write mappings to transfer data between virtual machines in order to reduce 
copying overhead and to allow for memory sharing. 
D.       ALPHA ARCHITECTURE 
The Alpha is a 64-bit load and store RISC machine [Ref. 25]. The Alpha is 
designed with particular emphasis on clock speed, multiple processors and multiple 
instructions issue, all of which have an effect on processor performance. Similar to IA- 
64 architecture, the Alpha architecture was designed as a 64-bit architecture; all 
operations are performed between 64-bit registers. The instructions are very simple and 
are 32 bits in length. Memory operations are either loads or stores. The Alpha supports 
the Open VMS Alpha, DIGITAL UNIX and Windows NT Alpha. 
One of the goals of the Alpha architecture is to implement functions without 
microcode. However, it is desirable to provide an architectural interface to these 
functions that will be consistent across the entire processor family. The Privileged 
Architecture Library (PALcode) provides this interface. The implementation of the 
PALcode differs for each operating system. PALcode implements some low-level 
hardware support functions that are too complex, too costly, or otherwise impractical to 
implement directly in the processor's hardware and which cannot be achieved by a 
normal operating system. These low-level hardware support functions include: 
(1) Privileged instructions 
(2) Atomic operations such as context switching, returns from exceptions or 
interrupts that require complete access to the underlying hardware 
(3) Complex sequences such as translation buffer fill routines 
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(4) Instruction emulation without hardware support 
(5) Power-up initialization and booting 
In some architectures, microcode handles these low-level hardware support 
functions. The Alpha architecture is designed to not to mandate the use of microcode for 
reasonable implementations. Therefore, PALcode provides a special environment 
between the processor and the operating system to handle these hardware functions. 
Figure 14 shows the role of PALcode in Alpha architecture. 
APPLICATIONS 
PALCODE OPERATING SYSTEM 
HARDWARE 
Figure 14. PALcode Role in Alpha Architecture From Ref. [25]. 
Applications have access to PALcode and to the operating system. This 
capability allows the applications to have direct access to low-level hardware support 
functions through PALcode, or to interact with them through the operating system. The 
operating system can either have direct access to the low-level hardware support functions 
or can give control to PALcode. 
PALcode runs in a special privileged environment called PALmode. PALcode is 
written with the standard Alpha instruction set plus five reserved opcodes to implement 
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PALcode-specific instructions. These opcodes have implementation-specific extentions 
that provide low-level hardware support functions for changing states, reading and 
modifying hardware control registers. PALcode-specific instructions: 
(1) Perform physical memory load or store operations without invoking 
memory management routines 
(2) Move data to and from internal processor registers 
(3) Switch the PALcode environment to the native-mode environment 
PALcode is invoked at specific entry points and certain well-defined conditions. 
PALcode can be invoked by the following hardware and software operations: 
(1) Reset 
(2) Hardware exceptions (e.g., arithmetic trap) 
(3) Memory management exceptions 
(4) Interrupts 
(5) CALL-PAL instructions 
The  Alpha  architecture  allows  two  methods  of entry  into  the  PALmode 
environment: 
(1) Hardware-detected: PALcode responds to a hardware event (e.g., reset, 
interrupts, arithmetic exceptions). 
(2) Software-initiated: PALcode responds to a privileged or unprivileged CALL- 
PAL function. 
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The Alpha architecture is designed to support virtualization [Ref. 26]. PALcode 
provides an interface without microcode for privileged instructions. All privileged and 
sensitive instructions are required to be implemented by PALcode. PALcode is required 
to be replaceable, allowing per-operating system code to achieve high performance. The 
Alpha architecture is designed such that the operating system can ensure that there is no 
way to bypass the protection mechanisms. Even "UNPREDICTABLE" results or 
occurrences (i.e., the results or occurrences that may vary from moment to moment, 
implementation to implementation, and instruction to instruction within implementations) 
are constrained, therefore, security and virtualization are supported. Additionally, as a 
result of "UNDEFINED" operations (i.e., operations that may vary from moment to 
moment, implementation to implementation, and instruction to instruction within 
implementations), the processor may contain wrong information or may lose information. 
However, these UNDEFINED operations will not cause security problems since they can 
only be executed by privileged software [Ref. 26]. 
E.       CONCLUSION 
After analyzing current VMM architectures and virtualization techniques, it is 
clear that some slight modifications to the Intel IA-64 architecture could make 
virtualization easier. First, all 18 sensitive, unprivileged instructions could be 
redesignated as privileged instructions. However, this solution may cause performance 
degradation problems, because unprivileged instructions will now trap to the VMM, 
whereas they did not previously. 
The second modification could be to implement a trap on op-code instruction 
[Ref. 7]. By adding a new instruction to the architecture, an operating system could treat 
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the sensitive unprivileged instructions as if they were privileged.   This modification 
makes virtualization easier and does not affect the current operating systems. 
Without these two modifications, virtualization will be much harder. Additional 
code is required in order to force the sensitive, unprivileged instructions to trap to the 
VMM. Additional code may cause security problems, because it would violate the 
verifiability requirements of the reference monitor concept since the security kernel 
would no longer be simple, small and understandable. 
Additionally, without modification, a processor must check every instruction 
before the instruction executes to determine if the instruction is one of the eighteen 
problem instructions. (Of course, undocumented instructions exist, the VMM will not 
operate correctly, because the VMM will not recognize the undocumented instruction.) 
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VI.     CONCLUSION 
This thesis analyzed the Intel IA-64 architecture's capability to support a secure 
virtual machine monitor. The thesis began by studying the Intel IA-64 architecture. 
Innovations and new features as well as the application and system state organization and 
addressing, protection mechanisms of the IA-64 architecture were studied. Then, virtual 
machine and virtual machine monitor concepts were introduced. Three types of the 
virtual machine monitors and the hardware requirements for each type were covered. 
After that, analysis of the Intel IA-64 architecture's support for a virtual machine monitor 
was done. The IA-64 architecture was mapped to the hardware requirements. A large 
part of this analysis involved looking at each of the documented instructions of the IA-64 
architecture. Approximately 150 instructions were analyzed to determine if the IA-64 
architecture is virtualizable. The analysis showed that although the IA-64 architecture 
meets three main hardware requirements to support a Type I VMM, it contains sensitive 
unprivileged instructions. Eighteen sensitive unprivileged instructions violate the 
hardware virtualization requirements, preventing the IA-64 architecture from being 
virtualizable. 
Although the IA-64 architecture is not virtualizable, some other architectures 
were examined to determine what changes could help the IA-64 architecture be 
virtualizable. Several virtualization techniques that might be applicable to virtualizing 
the IA-64 architecture were discussed. 
A secure VMM on the IA-64 architecture would offer several benefits. First, it 
could eliminate the need for dedicated systems for each security level. Second, PC users 
would be able to work in a high assurance system and still run COTS operating systems. 
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The Intel IA-64 architecture has features that might be used to construct secure 
systems. However, before trying to implement a secure Type I VMM for the Intel IA-64 
architecture, some slight modifications to the processor are needed. 
A.       FUTURE WORK 
Two areas of future work seem feasible. First, IA-64 designers might look at the 
VAX security kernel architecture in more detail and determine how this architecture was 
modified to support virtual machines. Exploration of the feasibility of implementing these 
modifications on the Intel IA-64 architecture would be useful. 
Second, it would be useful to look at the source code of the plex86 product which 
provides a Type II VMM for the Intel x86 architecture. Analysis of how this source code 
provides virtualization would be a good opening for developing a VMM for the IA-64 
architecture. 
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